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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Internal Migrant Workers and Hukou System
The gradual economic opening initiated by China in 1978 has led to a tremendous num-
ber of rural-to-urban migrants. China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimates that in
2017 there were about 286.5 million internal Chinese migrant workers, equivalent to
about 35% of the total workforce1. Of these, 172 million were long distance migrants.
Nearly every other long distance migrant has moved to a different province for work.
High labour demand in manufacturing and service industries in urban regions together
with poverty in many rural areas are the main drivers of these massive migratory flows.
Internal migrant workers in China are defined as people who reside and work in ar-
eas other than the place where their hukou is offically registered. The hukou system 2 is
a household registration system established about six decades ago to facilitate resource
distribution, to control internal migration and to monitor criminal behavior. The hukou
determines individuals’ official place of residence and submits the right to migrate inside
China to the approval of local governments. Each person is ascribed a household regis-
tration status (or hukou status) classified either as “rural" or as “urban", which ties the
person to a single administrative unit. An individual must be registered in one and only
one place and can only draw on welfare benefits in the place of registration. Families
were originally registered where they permanently resided when the policy was first en-
1 Unless otherwise specified, the estimates in this section are based on an annual survey of
migrant workers conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Results are published at
http://www.clb.org.hk/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children.
2This description of the hukou system draws on Chan (2010) and Hao and Yu (2015).
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forced, in the late 1950s. Subsequently children have automatically inherited the hukou
status of one of their parents 3. Children of migrants holding a rural hukou are thus still
deemed rural, even if they were born in the city where their parents migrated.
Until the late 1970s the rural population was barred from moving to urban areas
through the hukou system. Since the 1980s, along with economic development, the
government has allowed some limited rural-to-urban mobility, but de facto migration
to cities overwhelmingly surpassed officially registered moves. While the hukou policy
has contributed to maintaining social stability in the face of geographically highly un-
equal economic growth and varying living conditions, it has confined the rural Chinese
to being second-class citizens, deprived of rights to access public services and welfare
programs available in more developed urban areas. The majority of migrant workers
are employed in sectors such as construction, manufacturing or service industries where
local urban workers do not want to work. The wage of migrant workers has been increas-
ing in recent years (shown in Figure 1.1), however, the level is barely enough to maintain
a living in China’s cities 4. Moreover, few of them have signed a formal employment con-
tract with their employers and so are covered by social security. It is estimated that less
than one quarter of migrant workers in 2017 had a basic pension or medical insurance.
The Chinese central government has issued guidelines aiming to relax these discrimina-
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tory policies against migrant workers. But as described in (ChinaLaborBulletin, 2018)
3 Until 1998 a newborn’s hukou status followed that of his mother (Chan and Buckingham,
2008).
4For example, in 2018, the estimated monthly cost of living excluding rent in Shanghai and
in Guangzhou is around RMB 4000 ($590) and RMB 3400 ($495), respectively. RMB (renminbi)
is the official currency in People’s Republic of China. The figures come from an online source
https://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living (in the absence of official statistical estimates).
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mainly small or medium-sized cities with limited social services and few decent job op-
portunities are implementing these guidelines. The situation of migrant workers has not
improved in large cities. Converting a rural hukou to a city one remains difficult. Work-
ers who migrate with their children face particular hardship. Without a local city hukou,
their children have very limited access to social benefits, especially education. Restric-
tions on access to public education of migrant workers’ children have forced millions of
Chinese migrant parents to decide whether to take their children along or to leave them
behind. In the following section we provide a short overview of the current situation of
internal migrant workers’ children.
1.2 The Children of Internal Migrant Workers
1.2.1 Migrant Children in Cities
The 1% National Population Sample Survey conducted by China’s National Bureau of
Statistics in 2015 showed that there were about 34.3 million children migrating to cities
with their parents. Even though these children live in cities, for the lack of a local hukou,
they may not draw on cities’ welfare benefits, such as public education.
Enrollment in public schools in China follows the policy of nearby enrollment. This
policy allows public schools to select students only among children who live in their
neighboring area. Together with the hukou system, the nearby enrollment policy prevents
many migrant children from attending public schools in cities.
Until 1996 migrant workers’ children were prevented from enrolling in urban public
schools. The central government has attempted to regulate migrant children’s access
to public education, most notably in the Provisional Regulations on Schooling for Children
of Migrant Populations in Cities and Townships of 1996 and 1998. Under this policy, local
governments in the rural areas were instructed to strictly limit the emigration of school-
aged children. Children who have custodians in their hukou registration place were to
receive the compulsory education 5 in the (rural) registration place. Only if they lacked
village custodians were they allowed to register in an urban public school, often incurring
extra admission fees.
5According to the Compulsory Education Act of the People’s Republic of China enacted in 1986,
compulsory education lasts for nine years and consists of six years of primary school and three
years of junior high school.
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In 2006, central policy makers attempted to relax rural-urban emigration limitations by
Article 12 of the Compulsory Education Act of the People’s Republic of China: “School-aged
children or adolescents, who have parents or other legal custodians working or living
in places other than the hukou-registration places, who receive compulsory education
in places other than the hukou-registration places, should be provided by local govern-
ments with equal conditions in receiving compulsory education. The specific policy can
be designed by provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities."
However, since the law provides them with some local autonomy, local governments
do not always implement the centrally defined guidelines. For example, in Zhejiang
provinces some schools continue to ask proof that no custodians exist in the home vil-
lage and schools still impose special fees on migrant children (Chen et al., 2016). The
public schools in Beijing require up to eight documents from migrant children’s parents,
some of which are very hard to get 6. Migrant children whose parents can not offer all
required documents may be accepted by public schools if migrant families can afford so-
called ”sponsorship fees” charged by public schools. The fees are far from insignificant.
A children without Beijing hukou was force to pay per term extra fees ranging from RMB
1200($175) to more than RMB 8000($1167) (Goodburn, 2009). Shanghai is considered as
the most accommodating city with regard to migrant worker’s children education. Al-
most all migrant worker’s children in Shanghai can attend a primary school, but beyond
junior high school, migrant youth have little access to education if they stay there (Chen
and Feng, 2013). These local policies have led to the creation of privately run low quality
migrant schools, where migrant children excluded from public education are registered
as a last resort.
Private migrant schools are specially designed for the numerous migrant children who
cannot be accepted by public schools. They provide affordable education, but often fail
to meet the standards set by regulations. With little qualified teachers and poor facilities,
these schools are at the risk of being shut down by governments at any moment. For
example, one of the largest migrant schools in Beijing, with a student body of about 2000,
was forced by regulators to relocate further outside the city by 2018 (ChinaLaborBulletin,
2018).
The hukou system and the crackdown on private migrant schools discourage migrant
workers to take their children with them. Many migrant parents choose to leave their
6For instance, in order to gain an approval permit for temporary schooling, migrant parents in
Beijing need to present, among other official documents, a temporary residence permit, a migrant
work permit, one parents’ hukou, identity cards, population planning certificate. Few migrants
can obtain all of these documents (Goodburn,2009).
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children behind in rural villages.
1.2.2 Left Behind Children in Rural Villages
According to a All-China Women’s Federation report, in 2013 about 61 million Chinese
children - one out of every five in China - are left behind, three quarters of which only
see their migrant parents once a year7. As shown in Figure 1.2, they are cared for either
by one parent, by relatives (usually grandparents, who tend to be illiterate), by friends or
they are enrolled in boarding schools. More than 2 million of children live alone.
.
53% (32 million)
33% (20 million)
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3% (2.1 million)
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Live with grandparents
Live with others
Live alone
Source: All China Womens’s Ferderation 2013, People’s Daily, CCR CSR.
Figure 1.2: Number and share of left behind children, by living arrangements
As with left behind children in many other developing countries, Chinese rural left
behind children suffer intensely from lots of tragedies. Statistics on the prevalence of
tragedies are lacking, but anecdotal evidence abounds. Some examples are quoted here
to illustrate the hardship these children face. In 2012, one left behind boy and three
left behind girls aged between five and thirteen drank pesticide and died of poisoning
in Bijie, a village in Guizhou province which is notorious for high numbers of left be-
hind children8. The Economist, October 17th 2015, reported that a teacher in a boarding
school in Gansu province in the north-west of China was executed for abusing 26 primary
7A much lower estimate of 9.02 million children left behind in rural areas was reported in
November 2016 by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs. Only 360,000 of them were not under any-
one’s direct care. Nearly two out of three were aged between 6 and 13 years old, i.e. of compulsory
school age. This discrepancy stems from the use of different definitions: whereas the All-China
Women’s Federation considers a child left behind if it is aged under 18 and either parent has mi-
grated, the Ministry of Civil Affairs only includes children aged 0 to 16 left by both parents. It
is the former definition that complies with the guidelines of the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) and is more widely accepted (see for example The Economist, October 17th 2015, page
29-30).
8The story is cited from The Washinton Post, June 15th 2015.
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school students and in Ningxia province, a teacher got life in prison for raping 12 of his
pupils, 11 of whom were left behind. Long time parent-child separation contributes to
the high suicide rate for rural youth in China, which is 3 times higher than in urban areas
(R.Phillips et al., 2002).
Despite knowing that leaving their children behind may hurt their children’s physical
and physiological health, parents can consider migrating to the cities as the only way to
escape poverty, both for themselves and for their children. If they choose to bring their
children along to the city, their children cannot obtain the same educational opportunities
as urban children (unless the parents obtain the local city hukou, which is very unlikely).
Migrant workers must therefore face the dilemma of taking their children with them or
not and must face the effect of their decision on their children’s educational achievement
and on their household educational expenditure.
1.3 Structure of The Dissertation
This dissertation explains the current situation and dilemma confronted by China’s inter-
nal migrant workers. It provides guidance for migrant workers and political implication
for governments on the issue of migrant workers’ children in China’s cities. We first
set up a theoretical model of the optimal choice of the migrant workers on how to lo-
cate their children. Subsequently we analyze empirically the educational achievement
of migrant workers’ children. Finally, we focus on the education-related expenditure of
households in China’s cities. The three following chapters of this dissertation are self-
contained works. The notations may not be consistent among chapters but are always
consistent within each chapter.
Chapter 2, entitled ”Migrant Workers’ Choice: to Migrate with or without Children”,
studies where Chinese internal migrant workers should locate their school-aged children
and how they should optimally invest in their children’s private education. The theoret-
ical optimum is obtained by maximizing migrant workers’ utility which includes house-
hold consumption and their children’s human capital accumulation. Depending on the
educational investment migrant parents make and on the cost of relocating to the cities,
necessary and sufficient conditions under which migrant parents should take their chil-
dren with them and should invest in private education for their children are provided.
Chapter 3, "Are There School Performance Differences between Chinese Internal Mi-
grants’ Children?", examines whether the decision of migrant parents on children’s mi-
6
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gration affect the children’s school performance. Empirical evidence based on a large-
scale Chinese migration survey suggests that migrant children outperform left-behind
children, especially for test scores in Chinese language. It is also shown that younger
children having migrated with parents to the cities have an advantage over their left be-
hind counterparts, but this gap disappears with the age of the children. Among children
in junior high school, school performance of left-behind children is better than that of
migrant children after controlling for family and regional characteristics.
The fourth Chapter, "Private Educational Expenditure Inequality between Migrant
and Urban households in China’s Cities", compares the educational expenditure of par-
ents migrating with children to China’s cities to that of local urban parents, with a special
focus on the role of the hukou in shaping these inequalities. The results show that total
educational expenditure of migrant households overwhelmingly exceeds that of locals
after controlling for social and economic characteristics, but expenditure type is differ-
ent. Migrants allocate large amounts to tuition and sponsorship fees, which are often
imposed as a consequence of the hukou policy. Concerning private tutoring, local urban
households spend much more than migrants.
7

Chapter 2
Migrant Workers’ Choice: to
Migrate with or without
Children
2.1 Introduction
While increasing numbers of rural-to-urban migrants bring the economic benefits, the
associated social challenges are daunting. Policy makers have attempted to reign migra-
tion in by perpetuating a 1950s policy of restricting each individuals’ access to free public
education and health care to his locality of official residence, typically that of his birth.
Notwithstanding this obstacle, as well as serious psychological costs, many Chinese fam-
ilies have chosen to split, leaving children and old parents behind in rural villages. Other
families prefer to migrate together with their children, risking to squander the potential
of their offspring, as in the destination cities educational opportunities for rural children
are limited.
Migrant children inherit their parents’ official (rural) registration place and face bar-
riers in accessing public services. Their chances of obtaining official city residency are
slim, even later in their adult life, except if they earn a university degree, because high
skilled workers are still much demanded in China’s urban labor markets. Because of its
pivotal role in families’ long run wellbeing, the children’s educational achievement is a
crucial concern for parents. Consequently, assuming migrant workers utility depends on
9
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their own, their children’s and their parents’ consumption, as well as the human capi-
tal of their children, we investigate what are Chinese migrant workers’ optimal choices
regarding the location of their school-aged children: leave them behind in rural home
village or take them to the city?
Left behind children in many developing countries have been found to be at a great
risk of living on the edge of society, falling victim to drug abuse, teenage pregnancy,
psychosocial problems and violent behavior (Cortes, 2008). In China, existing literature
suggests that parental migration has a negative impact on the growth of children who are
left behind in rural village. Comparing with non-left behind children, left behind children
have significantly worse height and weight (Tian et al., 2017). Using a survey in Anhui
province, Yang et al. (2016) found that parental migration is associated with an increase
in smoking behavior. The recent qualitative study did by Zhao et al. (2018) demonstrates
that parent-child separation following migration often disrupted their relationships and
left behind children were more likely to suffer from depression or psycho-social difficul-
ties.
If brought to the city, as described in section 1.2, migrant children cannot benefit from
the same opportunities as local urban children (Liu et al., 2017, Lu, 2008, Milcent, 2010,
Mou et al., 2013, Sun et al., 2016, Li et al., 2010). Cost can be imposed by administrative
restriction, for instance, extra fees are required to pay to be enrolled in public schools. The
cost of medical care in cities is higher than that in rural areas 1. Except for that, migrant
workers often live in dormitories provided by their employers. Migrating with children
may increase their financial burden on account of rent paid.
While previous empirical work indicates that both leaving children behind and mi-
grating with them may prevent migrants from fully realizing their educational and earn-
ing potential, no study has, to the best of our knowledge, provided a theoretical frame-
work under which conditions that migrant parents should migrate with children and
under which they should leave their children behind. Even in the international migra-
tion literature, for instance, UNICEF’s systematic studies about left behind and migrant
children, focus either on children migrating to developed economies, such as UK (Craw-
ley, 2009), France (Kirszbaum et al., 2009), Germany (Clauss and Nauck, 2009), Australia
(Katz and Redmond, 2009), the Netherlands (De Valk et al., 2009) and Switzerland (Fibbi
and Wanner, 2009), or on left-behind children in developing countries such as Indonesia,
Thailand and Philippines (Bryant, 2005), Argentina, Chile and South Africa (Yaqub, 2009)
1 A 2012 survey in the city of Cixi, Zhejiang province, found for example that 57 percent of
migrant children did not have any medical insurance, see China Labor Bulletin at http://www.
clb.org.hk.
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or Mexico and Salvador (de La Garza, 2010). This chapter aims to fill this gap by studying
what is the optimal choice of migrating parents on where to locate their children.
We investigate whether migrant parents can afford to take their children to the city
and whether they provide their children with private education regardless their children
are migrant or left behind. We consider migrant workers decide jointly on whether to
migrate with their children or leave them behind and on whether they invest in their
private education or not. The migrant workers’ decision depends on two key parame-
ters: the relocation cost of children and the educational investment parents are able and
willing to make. The relocation cost encompasses the fees paid for enrolling children in
urban schools, the extra health care costs and generally any living costs associated with
children living in the city. The educational investment is the share of migrant workers’
lifetime income that is invested in children’s education. This share is the ratio between
the importance of children’s education and the whole family’s consumption. Our model
provides relocation cost thresholds for different income levels, which represent the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for migrant parents’ decision to take their children to
the city as opposed to leaving them behind. These thresholds increase not only with
migrants’ life-time income, but also with the gap in public education quality between
the migrants’ home rural village and their host city. In other words, the discrepancy in
quality between public urban and rural education implicitly hinders migrant workers to
migrate with their children.
The private education decision of migrant parents depends on the relationship be-
tween educational investment and the public education input. Not surprisingly, suffi-
ciently high public education input discourages parents’ from investing in private ed-
ucation. Regarding private education, the standard result in the literature is that high
income parents provide more private education to their children than low income ones
(de La Croix and Doepke, 2003). Our finding is that private educational input depends on
relative income, which relies on how much parents value education and lifetime income.
Thus, if all parents care about their children’s education equally, the standard result in
the literature holds in our setting as well. Nonetheless, for many families in rural regions
in China, getting assess to higher education is considered as an effective way of getting
out of poverty. Low income parents might value education more than parents who are
better off. They would thus be willing to pay a higher share of their income for the private
education of their children.
The rest of chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 builds up the model to obtain
the optimal choice of consumption and private educational investment. Section 2.3 pro-
vides the theoretical answers to the original question of when migrant workers should
11
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take their children to migrate and when they should leave their children behind. Section
2.4 discusses the dynamics and long run outcome. Finally, the last section concludes this
chapter.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
In this section, we examine whether the migrant parents can afford to take their children
to migrate and how should they invest in their children’s private education.
2.2.1 The Model
We consider migrants who have rural hukou but work in a urban area. Suppose each
individual is one household and will live for two periods: young and old. The lifetime
utility of generation t is
Ut = u(ct) + βu(dt+1) + γU
f
t , (2.1)
where ct and dt+1 represent consumption in young and old age respectively, with param-
eter β(∈ (0, 1)) denoting time preference. Following the concept of altruism introduced
by Lucas and Stark (1985) and the Chinese tradition of children providing support for
old parents, 2 we assume that individuals also take care the other family members (par-
ents, children, siblings etc.), which is denoted by Uft , with γ(∈ (0, 1)) being the altruism
parameter. For simplicity, we take
Uft = aPuP
(cP,t
N
)
+ aKuk(ck,t, hk,t+1), (2.2)
where cp measures parents’ consumption 3, N is number of siblings who share the cost
of old age parents. For simplicity, we assume that, in each household, there is one child
given all children are treated equally4. ck and hk,t+1 are children’s consumption and
2The left-behinds are not only children, but also parents. The Economist August 29th 2015
reported that: In 2009-11 people over 65 accounted for just under half of all suicides, and more in rural
area: living alone in old age can be harsh anywhere, but in China it may be particularly isolating, given
that so many young Chinese have left their villages, and parents, in search of work. The government has
tried to enforce filial piety, passing a law in 2013 that threaten fines or jail if people fail to visit parents and
feed their ‘spiritual needs’.
3If there are young siblings in the family, we consider their consumption as part of parents’
consumption.
4Until 2015 China held a one child policy. However, some families who satisfied the conditions
required by local governments were allowed to have a second child.
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human capital accumulation. We consider that an individual care less for her parents
than her children, aP is thus less than or equal to aK5.
Denote human capital of migrant workers as ht which checks ht ≥ h0 with h0 mea-
suring raw labor. Suppose unit human capital wage is wt, which is given exogenously,
an individual with human capital ht earns income wtht. This income is divided among
four additive components: her current (and family’s) consumption(ct), savings st for old
age, consumption related remittances Mt and children’s private education related costs
g(et). Consumption related remittances refer to the amount of money sent back home in
order to support parents’ old age and the costs of raising the dependent children who are
left behind. Private education-related cost include not only the regular fees paid to the
school such as tuition or private tutoring cost but also the special fees existing in Chinese
context. For example, many children who are left behind pay and live in their teachers’
home. In some mountainous regions, considering the school is far away from the village
where children live, the custodians of these children, usually the grandparents, may rent
a room close to the school so that the children do not need to take long commutes to go
to school every day. For those children migrating to the city with their parents, as we
explain in Chapter 1, extra fees are charged to them if they would like to attend the local
urban schools. The migrant worker thus faces the following financial budget constraint6
:
ct + st + g(et) +Mt = wtht. (2.3)
When the migrant is old, her consumption consists of savings when they were young
with interest rate rt+1, possible old age working income but with some discounted hu-
man capital φht (parameter 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) and some exogenous transfer from her adult
children or/and public pension, which we denote by T˜t+1 = m˜t+1 + p˜t+1. Thus the old-
age budget constraint is
dt+1 = st(1 + rt+1) + wt+1φht + T˜t+1. (2.4)
In equation (2.2), the utility of parents depends not only on children’s consumption,
but also on their children’s human capital accumulation. For the special case of Chinese
rural migrant workers, we modify the formulation of human capital accumulation, which
5 The implications of this assumption will be clarified in Section 2.4.2.
6For the migrant families with children left behind, the remittance is assumed to cover the con-
sumption of the migrant workers’ parents and their children as well as their children’s education-
related cost. However, if the children migrate to the city, the migrant workers may still send
money back to the rural village to support their parents’ consumption. Therefore, in equation 2.3,
we separate the education-related cost from the remittance.
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is suggested by de Brauw and Giles (2012, 2016) and de La Croix and Doepke (2003), in
the following equation:
hjt+1 = h0 +B
j
t (θj + e
j
t )
ηhα
j
t (h
j
t )
κ, j = m, l. (2.5)
We use j to define the location of the children’s education: j = m captures the case
that the children receive education in the place where they migrate with their parents,
while j = l represents the children who are left behind and attend school in their rural
village.
In this equation, h0 is raw labor, parameter η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of public
and parents’ contribution to the children’s human capital outcome, αj is parents’ human
capital impact, κ(∈ [0, 1 − η]) can be interpreted as the effect of the quality of school,
and hjt is the average human capital of teachers. The positive parameter θj measures free
public education, indicating that even if the parents do not invest private education on
their children, children will still benefit from public education if they make efforts, that
is, if Bjt > 0.
Here Bjt represents a learning productivity parameter, indicating children’s ability,
their motivation and effort to study at time t. To account for the circumstances of the lost
generation of left behind children7, we considerBjt can be equal to zero. A positive and large
value for Blt would suggest that the left behind children are highly motivated and work
hard in school, which is confirmed by some anecdotal evidence reported in the media.
However, it may be more reasonable to expect Bl to be just slightly larger than zero since
the left-behind children lack parental affection, supervision and discipline, they often
need to undertake household chores such as cooking and washing clothes, and many of
them have to take care of younger siblings or do farm work. Blt may vary among the
children, such as their age, gender etc., reflecting that boys may suffer more from being
left behind than girls, or that young children may be affected more by the separation from
their parents than older ones.
Bmt is hardly expected to be high. Many migrant children struggle with the new en-
vironment in the city and they are discriminated by schools in urban areas (Wang, 2008).
Moreover, depending on the differences between the curricula of their origin and desti-
nation school, migrant children may face difficulties in following lectures.
7See for example, the BBC news reported on Septemper 1st 2011 at: http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-pacific-14743222 and on 2nd October 2012 at: http://www.bbc.
com/news/magazine-19787240. The article on Wall Street Journal at: http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579260900849637692.
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In equation (2.5) above, the term hα
j
t captures the inter-generational human capital
transfer. αj = 1 means that the new generation inherits the same human capital as their
parents. However, given the left behind children grow up without the companionship
from their parents, they may obtain little skills from their parents, which leads to the
assumption that αl = 0. Even if the children migrate with parents, their human capital
accumulation may be hindered by the unavailability of parents to supervise homework.
Thus, we impose 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1. Having presented each term in equation (2.5), we now turn
to the assumptions needed to study the differences in human capital accumulation of the
left behind and the migrant children.
Assumption 1 • Urban schools have better education infrastructure and better teachers
than those in rural regions: θm > θl , hmt > hlt .
• The inter-generational parameter checks: 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1, j = m, l.
• The productivity parameter satisfies: Bjt ≥ 0, j = m, l.
Assumption 2 The private education costs follow:
g(et) = g
j(ejt ) =
{
(elt + kl), for left behind children j = l,
(emt + km), for migrant children j = m
with per child relocation cost km > 0, while staying at the original location it is normalized to
kl = 0 and e
j
t indicating whether migrant parents chose to offer private education to their children
or not.
Under Assumption 1 and 2, the migrant worker’s optimization problem is:
max
ct, st,Mt, et
Ut = u(ct) + βu(dt+1) + γ
[
aPuP
(cP, t
N
)
+ aKuk(ck, t, hk, t+1)
]
,
subject to the two period budget constraints (2.3) and (2.4), the children’s human capital
accumulation (2.5) and the remittance constraint which will be presented later.
To get explicit solutions we take the logarithm of the utility function yielding,
Ut = ln(ct) + β ln(dt+1) + γaP ln
(cP, t
N
)
+ γaK [ln(ck, t) + β˜k ln(hk, t+1 − h0)].
We assume here that parents care equally for all of their children and denote β˜k ∈ [0, 1]
a parameter that measures how much parents value children’s education compared to
their children’s consumption. hk, t+1 − h0 measures human capital, since the physical
capital, parents provided for their children, is already included in the ck term. It shows
that parents pay attention to their children’s consumption and education.
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It is clear from the above functional form that if Bjt = 0, the last term ln(hk, t+1−h0) =
−∞, the parents thus do not have an optimal interior choice. Therefore we present two
difference cases: (1) the “normal case" where children have some motivation and make
some effort to study in school, that is, Bjt > 0 and (2) the case of the “lost generation"
where Bjt = 0.
2.2.2 Theoretical Results - The Normal Case
Since the children in our study may migrate with their parents or be left behind, we treat
children’s and parents’ consumption separately. This distinguishes our work from the
classical overlapping generations literature, such as de La Croix and Doepke (2003).
As most of the left behind children are living with their grandparents, we make no
difference between the children and their grandparents’ consumption, that is, we assume
and normalize to family consumption cf :
clk = cP := cf . (2.6)
Then the migrant’s remittance checks
cP, t
N
+ clk, t ≤M lt + y˜, (2.7)
which states that the consumption of left behind children and their grandparents de-
pends on remittances and other exogenous income, y˜, most likely income from agricul-
ture or leasing farmland. Here the cost of aged parents is shared by total N siblings of
the migrant adults. Thus, the migrants’ utility can be rewritten as:
Ut = ln(c
l
t) + β ln(d
l
t+1) + (γaP + ΓK) ln(cf,t) + ΓK β˜k ln(h
l
k, t+1 − h0), (2.8)
with ΓK = γaK being the altruism factor for children.
If children migrate, the remittances will be purely supporting left behind aged parents
and verify
cP
N
≤Mmt + y˜. (2.9)
The migrants’ utility is
Ut = (1 + ΓK) ln(c
m
t ) + β ln(d
m
t+1) + γaP ln(cp,t) + ΓK β˜k ln(h
m
k, t+1 − h0). (2.10)
Definition 1 We call {cjt , sjt , ejt ,M jt } ( j = l,m) an optimal choice if it maximizes utility (2.8)
(or (2.10)) under budget constraints (2.3), (2.4), (2.7) (or(2.9) ) and the children’s human capital
accumulation (2.5) with Assumptions 1 and 2.
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The standard first order condition yields that
djt+1 =

β(1 + r)clt, j = l,
β(1 + r)
1 + ΓK
cmt , j = m.
(2.11)
Equation (2.11) shows the relationship between the two periods’ marginal utility. Taking
into account the old-age consumption constraint, we obtain that the migrant’s savings
follow
sjt =

βclt −
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
, j = l,
β
1 + ΓK
cmt −
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
, j = m.
(2.12)
The same calculation as above yields that
cf
(
1
N
+ 1
)
= M lt + y˜ = (γap + ΓK)c
l
t or
cmP
N
= Mmt + y˜ =
γap
1 + ΓK
cmt . (2.13)
The intuition behind equation (2.13) is straightforward: the left-hand side is the cumula-
tive consumption of all left-behind children and old parents, which will be covered by the
remittances and the potential income left behind y˜. At the same time this consumption
is determined based on the migrant’s own consumption corrected by the altruism factors
of children and parents, γap and ΓK .
The optimal choice of private education ejt must satisfy
1
clt
(
or
(1 + ΓK)
cmt
)
=
ΓK β˜k
hjk, t+1 − h0
Bjth
αj
t (h
j)κ(θj + e
j
t )
η−1η,
where the left-hand side is the marginal loss of consumption due to the educational in-
vestment and the right-hand side presents the marginal gain for children’s human capital
accumulation. Rearranging terms in the above equation, the optimal education per child
is given by:
ejt =

ΓK β˜kηc
l
t − θl, j = l,
ΓK β˜kη
(1 + ΓK)
cmt − θm, j = m.
(2.14)
Substituting the above savings, remittances and private education costs into the bud-
get constraint, it follows that for j = l,m,
clt
(
or
cmt
1 + ΓK
)
(1 + β + γaP + ΓK + ΓK β˜kη) = wtht + y˜ +
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
− kj + θj ,
with kl = 0 and km > 0. We denote Wt = wtht + y˜ +
T˜t+1+φhtwt+1
1+r the lifetime earnings
composed of the labor incomes from the two periods, the potential income in the home
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village, the discounted old-age social transfers and the remittance from their adult chil-
dren. Thus the left-hand side is the aggregate lifetime cost, which includes consumption
by taking into account young and discounted old age, parents and children’s consump-
tions, plus the educational costs of children. The right-hand side is lifetime potential
income, which includes lifetime earnings and public social transfers for education net of
relocation costs of children’s schooling.
From the above analysis we conclude that:
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1 and 2 and assuming that Bj > 0 and β˜k > 0, for migrant
workers, there exists one and only one optimal choice, cin,jt which is given by
cin,jt =

(Wt + θl)
Λ
, j = l,
[Wt + (θm − km)](1 + ΓK)
Λ
, j = m,
(2.15)
sin,jt , e
in,j
t are given by (2.12) and (2.14) respectively and remittances are
M in,lt = (γaP + ΓK)c
in,l
t − y˜, M in,mt =
γaP
1 + ΓK
cin,mt − y˜, (2.16)
where
Λ = 1 + β + γap + ΓK(1 + β˜kη).
Finally, old-age consumption din,jt+1 is given by (2.11).
Noticing that migrant’s consumption, hence everyone’s consumption, increases in
terms of public education input, while private education cost decreases: ∂e
in,j
t
∂θj
= ΓK β˜kηΛ −
1 < 0. High public education input induces parents to decrease their private educational
investment. Thus, instead of providing private education to their children, parents con-
sume that part of income. This argument may lead to the case that no private investment
in education is an optimal choice. Therefore, to guarantee that in Proposition 1, ein,jt > 0,
the following are needed.
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1 and 2. Assume that Bj > 0 and β˜k > 0. The optimal
education investment ein,jt > 0 if and only if
ΓK β˜kη
λ
(Wt − kj) > θj (2.17)
with λ = 1 + β + γaP + ΓK .
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Condition (2.17) plays the role of Tobin’s-q in investment of education, whose intuition
is straightforward. The right-hand side is the total public education input of all children,
while the left-hand side measures the importance from education in term of consumption
and income. Ratio ΓK β˜kλ measures the relative importance of education compared to the
net of relocation income, (Wt − kj). Multiplied by the share, η, of educational input,
the left-hand side represents total importance of education, or the optimal desired level
of educational input. Proposition 2 states that there is private investment in children’s
education if and only if the public educational spending is lower than parents’ desired
level of educational input for their children.
In the following, for simplicity, we shall call ΓK β˜kηλ Wt as relative educational investment.
Additionally, keeping all other factors constant, education is relatively more expensive
for low income parents than for high income ones. Moreover, when migrant workers
migrate with their children, their investment on their children’s education is affected by
the relocation cost (km) in the city. In the case of j = l, leaving the children in rural
hometown, there is no relocation cost, that is, kl = 0, it may therefore occur that
ΓK β˜kη
λ
Wt > θl while
ΓK β˜kη
λ
(Wt − km) < θm. (2.18)
If that is the case, the following results hold:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 2 hold, especially, Bj > 0. If fur-
thermore, condition (2.18) holds, it is optimal to invest in children’s private education back home,
ein,lt > 0.
This proposition does not state that the migrant parents should take their children
to migrate or leave them behind. It only states that if the parents leave their children
behind and if condition (2.18) holds, then it is optimal to invest in their children’s private
education. Obviously, if they bring their children along, it is not optimal to invest in
education from the point of view of migrant workers’ utility maximization.
If the gap in public educational input between rural and urban areas is remarkable,
θm is largely above θl, condition (2.18) can be held even though migrating with children
will lead to the relocation cost km. However, condition (2.17) may fail in any case, which
it is called as a corner solution, denoted as ecot = 0.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold and Bj > 0. If there is no private educational
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investment, eco,jt = 0, the optimal consumption is
cco,lt =
Wt
λ
and cco,mt =
(Wt − km)(1 + ΓK)
λ
. (2.19)
Sco,jt ,M
co,j
t and d
co,j
t with j = l,m are given by (2.12), (2.13) and (2.11), respectively. Moreover,
eco,jt = 0 is an optimal choice if and only if
ΓK β˜kη
λ
(Wt − kj) ≤ θj , j = l,m. (2.20)
2.2.3 Theoretical Results - Lost Generation
To close this section, we briefly show the results of migrant parents’ choices if their chil-
dren have little motivation to study. In other words, in the human capital accumulation
equation, Bjt = 0, we thus have hk,t+1 = h0. These children, called the lost generation in
China, have nothing but raw labor. In this case, the migrant parents do not have an op-
timal educational choice for their children. Therefore, ejt = 0, j = l,m and the following
results can be obtained:
Proposition 5 Given Assumption 1 and 2. Assume thatBj = 0 and β˜k = 0, the unique optimal
choice of migrant workers is eL,jt = 0,
cL,jt =

Wt
λ , j = l,
(Wt−km)(1+ΓK)
λ , j = m,
ML,jt =

(γaP + ΓK)c
L,l
t − y˜, j = l,
γaP
1+ΓK
cL,mt − y˜, j = m.
The utility is
UL,jt = λ ln(c
L,j
t ) + β ln(β(1 + r)) + (γaP + ΓK) ln
(
γaP + ΓK
2
)
.
Obviously, both private and public educational investment are no longer migrant par-
ents’ concern, though the relocation cost km still decreases migrant parents’ consump-
tion.
The difference between the corner solution presented in last subsection and lost gen-
eration case is the following. In the former case, the children make an effort to study,
Bjt > 0, but parents may optimally choose not to invest in education, e
co,j = 0. However,
in the latter case, parents do not have a choice for their children’s education. There is
no private educational investment in both cases, cL,jt = c
co,j
t , but the children’s human
capital accumulation differs: hL,jt+1 = h0 because of B
j
t = 0; while h
co,j
t+1 > h0 given B
j
t > 0.
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2.3 When Should Migrants Leave Their Children Be-
hind?
Taking into account the optimal choices of migrant parents for the consumption, saving
and investment in their children’s private education, we turn to the question: Should
these migrant parents take their children with them? What are the conditions for them
to bring their children along? In this section, we answer the questions based on optimal
private education investment (ejt ) obtained from previous section as well as the relocation
cost threshold, the definition of which will be provided later.
According to migrant parents’ optimal choices for their children’s education, four pos-
sible combinations appear: (I) invest in private education wherever their children are:
ejt > 0, for both j = l and j = m; (II) offer no private education e
j
t = 0 in both two cases
j = l,m; (III) migrants invest in private education if they leave their children behind, oth-
erwise, no investment : elt > 0, emt = 0 and (IV) migrant children have private education,
but not the left-behind ones: elt = 0, emt > 0.
Assumption 1, θl < θm, rules out the case (IV)8. Therefore, in the following, we only
focus on the other three cases.
In China’s rural villages, many older left behind children take responsibility for taking
care of their younger brothers or sisters. In order to eliminate the effects of siblings, in
the following, we take N = 1. In addition, considering the human capital of migrant
parents transferring to their children’s human capital accumulation may be very limited
no matter whether parents migrate with their children or leave them behind, in the rest
of this chapter, we assume that
hα
m
t = h
αl
t .
2.3.1 Positive Private Education Regardless of The Location of
Children
Parents would like to offer their children optimal private education no matter where
their children are living, i.e. ejt > 0, for j = l,m. By Proposition 2, parents’ willingness
to invest in their children’s private education implies that migrant parents’ desired level
of educational input should satisfies condition (2.17), which can be rewritten as (recall
8This assumption may be not held for international migration.
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kl = 0)
0 < km < K̂
(I)
m ,Wt − λ
ΓK β˜kη
θm. (2.21)
This condition states that migrants’ educational investment must check
ΓK β˜kη
λ
Wt > θm. (2.22)
The utility of migrant parents is:
U jt = Λ ln(c
in,j
t ) + ΓK β˜k ln
[
Bjth
αj
t (h
j
t )
κ
]
+ εj + δj , j = l,m (2.23)
with
εl = β ln(β(1 + r)) + (γap + ΓK) ln
(
γap + ΓK
2
)
,
εm = β ln
(
β(1 + r)
1 + ΓK
)
+ γap ln
(
γap
1 + ΓK
)
,
δl = ΓK β˜kη ln
(
ΓK β˜kη
)
and
δm = ΓK β˜kη ln
(
ΓK β˜kη
(1 + ΓK)
)
.
To see what would be the difference between leaving their children behind and mi-
grating with them, we can easily check that:
U in,m − U in,l = Λ ln
[
Wt+K(θm−km)
Wt+θl
]
+ I(ak)
+ΓK β˜k
[
ln
(
Bmt
Blt
)
+ κ ln
(
hm
hl
)
+ ln
(
hα
m
t
hα
l
t
)]
,
(2.24)
where I(ak) stands for the gains from whole family being together which is deduced
from the difference in the altruistic terms:
I(ak) = (1 + ΓK) ln(1 + ΓK) + γap ln(γap) + (γap + ΓK) ln
(
2
γap + ΓK
)
.
Given 0 < γap < 1, it shows that as long as parents care for their children no less than
caring for their old age parents, that is, as long as ak ≥ ap, migrants are benefited from
taking children with them:
I(ak) > 0. (2.25)
It is trivial to see that if the relocation cost is sufficiently high, such as using up mi-
grants’ lifetime income: km > Wt+ θm, we have U in,m−U in,l = −∞. Obviously, the only
choice for migrants is leaving their children behind. At the same time, it is also easy to
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check that if there is no relocation cost, that is, km = 0, we haveU in,m−U in,l > 0 provided
Bm is not much smaller than Bl. The whole family migrating is better off compared to
leaving the children behind. By continuity, there exists positive constant
K(I)m = K
(I)
m
(
Wt, θm, θl,
Bm
Bl
,
hm
hl
)
,Wt + θm − Wt + θl
eI(ak)/Λ
(
Blhl
κ
hα
l
Bmhm
κ
hαm
)ΓK β˜k/Λ
, (2.26)
such that,
U in,m − U in,l
{
> 0 if 0 ≤ km < K(I)m ,
< 0 if km > K
(I)
m .
(2.27)
In other words, the threshold of relocation cost, K(I)m , determines the gains from mi-
grating with children. This threshold depends on the differences in quality of education
among different regions: θj and hj , and the children’s motivation Bj for j = l,m, given
parents’ human capital, and other altruistic parameters.
Additionally, the relocation cost threshold increases with the destination’s public in-
put in education, ∂K
(I)
m
∂θm
> 0, and decreases with the public educational input in rural
areas, ∂K
(I)
m
∂θl
< 0. Similarly, we can have that ∂K
(I)
m
∂
(
hm
hl
) > 0. In other words, the smaller
the educational gap between the original rural region and the destination city, the lower
is the relocation cost threshold; thus, it is easier and more beneficial for parents to bring
their children to migrate together. The larger the gap is, the higher is the relocation cost
threshold and the more difficult for parents to take their children along. The last state-
ment seems to be counterintuitive. The reason lies on the fact that migrant workers need
pay higher price if they would like to bring their children to the more developed cities in
which the quality of education is high. The price here is the relocation cost.
This result suggests that, with regards to the problem of left behind children, it is
essential for the policy maker to take measures to increase the educational input in the
poor rural regions, such that the educational gap between the rural and urban can be
reduced.
Remark. We are not talking about decreasing the development gap between different
rural and urban regions, which is not easy to achieve. Instead, we focus only on public
educational input and training of qualified teachers, which the policy maker in China are
quite possible to pursue.
We conclude the above analysis in the following:
Proposition 6 Suppose condition (2.22) is satisfied, the migrant workers invest in their chil-
dren’s private education regardless of the location their children. There exits a relocation cost
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threshold which is given by (2.26). This relocation cost is decreasing in terms of the educational
gap between urban and rural regions. Moreover,
• it is optimal for migrant parents to take their children with them and pay private education
in the destination (additional to the public education) city, if and only if,
km < min{K̂(I)m , K(I)m };
• otherwise, it is optimal for parents to leave their children behind and offer them with private
education (additional to public education) in the rural hometown.
The first part of this proposition is what we demonstrated above. And it is easy to
check that the migrant parents leave their children behind with private education if and
only if
km > max{K̂(I)m , K(I)m }.
Between the above two polar cases, given both K̂(I)m ≶ K(I)m are possible, the conclusion
is not straightforward. Nonetheless, if relocation cost checks K̂(I)m < km < K
(I)
m , though
parents are better off by taking their children to migrate, the private investment in educa-
tion can not reach to its optimal level. While if relocation cost checks K(I)m < km < K̂
(I)
m ,
migrant parents offer optimal private education to their children in the city, but they are
worse off in utility than leaving their children behind at least in the short-run. Therefore,
the last two cases both should belong to the second statement in the Proposition 6.
For relatively high income parents (or parents who care more for their children’s edu-
cation than consumption), this proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition
on which parents should take their children to migrate and provide them with private
education in the destination city. Violating this condition means either parents will be
worse off by taking their children to migrate than leaving their children behind, or it is
not an optimal educational choice. Leaving them behind with private education is the
optimal choice.
2.3.2 No Private Education Regardless of The Location of Chil-
dren
The other symmetric case, ejt = 0, for j = l,m, is that regardless where their children are
living, private education is too costly for migrant parents considering their income. By
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Proposition 2, that means the migrants’ relative educational investment checks
ΓK β˜kη
λ
Wt < θl (< θm) . (2.28)
In other words, either parents’ educational investment are too low compared with public
educational input or the public educational input is sufficiently high so that they do not
need invest privately in education. In either way, with no private education cost, the
migrant workers’ utility can be rewritten as
U jt = λ ln(c
co,j
t ) + ΓK β˜k ln
[
Bjt θ
η
j h
αj
t (h
j
t )
κ
]
+ εj , j = l,m. (2.29)
The high utility essentially results from high consumption and high human capital ac-
cumulation of children. Direct calculation yields that the difference in consumption be-
tween migrating with children and leaving them behind is:
cco,mt − cco,lt =
WtΓK − km(1 + ΓK)
λ
(
T 0
)
. (2.30)
Obviously, taking the children to migrate does not automatically increase the con-
sumption and utility. The difference in consumptions essentially lies on the relationship
between altruistic gain, WtΓK , and relocation cost of children, km(1 + ΓK). If the gain is
high enough to cover the relocation cost, everyone in the family would have higher con-
sumption with children migrated than leaving them behind. However, when the gain is
less than the cost, total consumption, including the migrant workers, their children and
their parents, are less than the ones leaving the children behind. In this scenario, the only
possible improvement in migrant worker’s utility is children’s human capital accumula-
tion, hmt+1−h0. Notwithstanding, there is no guarantee that the migrant children’s human
capital is better than those of being left-behind.
More precisely, similar to the previous case, direct calculation yields
U co,m − U co,l = λ ln
[
Wt−km
Wt
]
+ I(ak)
+ΓK β˜k
[
ln
(
Bmt
Blt
)
+ κ ln
(
hm
hl
)
+ ln
(
hα
m
t
hα
l
t
)
+ η ln
(
θm
θl
)]
,
(2.31)
in which the first term is always negative given km > 0 and the second and last terms are
always nonnegative, provided migrant children do not decrease too much their motiva-
tion and efforts compared to being left-behind.
Similar to Case (I), there exists positive relocation cost threshold
K(II)m = Wt
1−( Blhlκhαlθηl
Bmhm
κ
hαmθηm
)ΓK β˜k/λ
e−
I(ak)
λ
 , (2.32)
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such that,
U co,m − U co,l
{
> 0 if 0 ≤ km < K(II)m ,
< 0 if km > K
(II)
m .
(2.33)
Therefore, for this group of migrants, the following conclusion can be drawn:
Proposition 7 Suppose migrant’s income checks (2.28), that is, parents can not (or do not need
to) afford any private education to their children regardless where their children are living. There
is the relocation cost threshold, which is defined by (2.32), such that,
• if km < K(II)m , parents would be better off by taking their children to migrate;
• if km > K(II)m , it is optimal for parents to leave their children behind.
2.3.3 Positive Private Education Only If Children Being Left Be-
hind
elt > 0, e
m
t = 0
Parents may realize that the quality of education in the city is better than their rural
hometown and education is essentially important for their children’s future. In order
to let their children have better education, the migrant parents may invest in private
education for their children when they leave them behind, however, no private education
will be invested if these children migrate to the city. That is, via Proposition 2, public
educational input checks
θl <
ΓK β˜kη
λ
Wt < θm. (2.34)
In this case, parents’ utilities are:
U in,lt = Λ ln(c
in,l
t ) + ΓK β˜k ln
[
Blth
αl
t (h
l
t)
κ
]
+ εl + δl
and
U co,mt = λ ln(c
co,m
t ) + ΓK β˜k ln
[
Bmt θ
η
mh
αm
t (h
m
t )
κ
]
+ εm.
Thus, the difference is:
U co,m − U in,l = λ ln
[
Wt−km
Wt+θl
]
+ ΓK β˜kη ln
(
θm
ein,l+θl
)
+J(ak) + ΓK β˜k
[
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)
+ κ ln
(
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)
+ ln
(
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t
)]
,
(2.35)
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where J(ak) = λ ln
(
Λ
λ
)
+ (1 + ΓK) ln(1 + ΓK) > 0 and ein,l + θl =
ΓK β˜kη(Wt + θl)
KΛ
by
(2.14). Considering the terms in the second line are always nonnegative because of the as-
sumptions and if the migrant children’s motivation do not decrease too much compared
to being left behind. The second term on the right-hand side could be positive or negative
depending on the educational input ratio, θm
ein,l+θl
. If the destination’s public educational
input is sufficiently high, such that, θm > ein,l+θl, then children migration should benefit
from the public school in the destination. Nevertheless, the first term on the right-hand
side is always negative due to the relocation cost. More precisely, the relocation cost
threshold in this case is given by
K(III)m = Wt −
Wt + θl
eJ(ak)/λ
(
Blhl
κ
hα
l
Bmhm
κ
hαm
(
ein,l + θl
θm
)η)ΓK β˜k/λ
, (2.36)
This threshold can be positive or negative. The following conclusion can be made in this
case:
Proposition 8 Suppose condition (2.34) holds and relocation cost threshold K(III)m is defined by
(2.36),
• if K(III)m > 0 and if 0 < km < K(III)m , migrant parents are better off by taking their
children to migrate, though without private education in the destination;
• otherwise, if km > K(III)m , it is optimal for migrant parents to leave their children behind
but invest in their private education.
The information from the second part of this proposition is two-fold: (1) km > K
(III)
m >
0 and (2) km ≥ 0 > K(III)m . In the first case, it is still possible that reducing the real re-
location cost, km, to such an extend that parents are better off by taking the children to
migrate, for example, changing the policy that decreasing or eliminating the extra fees
charged to migrant children in public schools in the city. However, If K(III)m < 0, this
implies that the optimal choice for parents is leaving their children behind and investing
in their private education because it is too costly to migrate with their children.
2.3.4 Summary of Findings
Combining the above three cases, we summarize the findings in the Figure 2.1, which
gives precise idea where Chinese internal migrant parents should locate their children.
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Figure 2.1: Choice of migrant parents.
The decision depends on their income, concerns of human capital accumulation of their
children and relocation cost threshold.
In Figure 2.1, the horizontal axis is the relocation cost for children migration and the
vertical axis presents the private educational investment of migrant parents. Recall that
the educational investment is determined by mainly two parts: the lifetime income, Wt,
and how parents value children’s education in term of consumption, ΓK β˜kηλ . If all parents
value their children’s education equally, that is, ΓK β˜kηλ is the same for everyone, then par-
ents’ decision of taking their children to migrate or leaving them behind as well as how
to invest in their education, will only depend on income. Nonetheless, parents may value
their children’s education differently. It could happen that some high income parents do
not care about their children’s education due to the fact that education is not rewarded
as it should be or they are just too busy to care about their children’s schooling. If this
is true, their private educational investment , ΓK β˜kηλ Wt, is low compared to public ed-
ucational input. On the other hand, it is also possible that low income parents realize
how important education is to their children and consider it as the only way to get out
of poverty. They value ΓK β˜kηλ highly, such that,
ΓK β˜kη
λ Wt is high related to public educa-
tional input, though their income, Wt, is low. In other words, these parents sacrifice their
consumption, and the whole family’s consumption, in order to provide good education
for their children.
Given the work most of Chinese internal migrants undertake,9 the relative low income
9China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimates that in 2015, 31% migrant workers were em-
ployed in manufacturing sector, 21% in construction sectors, 12% in sales, 11% in household ser-
vices, 6% in transport and logistics, another 6% in hotel and catering services and the rest 13%
took others sector jobs.
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and high relocation cost may be the reason that there are so many Chinese young children
being left behind. Though the decision of leaving their children behind is difficult for
migrant parents, that may be the rational choice.
2.4 The Dynamics and The Long-run Outcomes
In this section, we will investigate what would be the long-run consequences from the
decision of Chinese internal migrant parents on where to locate their children and on
how to educate their children.
For rural children in China, except working as farmers or as migrant workers just like
their parents, they have two ways of changing their hukou status: (1) individual efforts
to succeed in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao in Chinese) and become
skilled labor after graduation and; (2) to be lucky falling into the urbanization process.
2.4.1 Gaokao and Urbanization
If Chinese rural children successfully enter and finish university study, their high edu-
cation will enable them to find a well paid job and live in the city, so will their future
children and descendants. Therefore, succeeding in Gaokao is essential for the family’s
short- and long-run welfare. Gaokao is usually a prerequisite for the entrance into most
of universities in China at the undergraduate level. Students take the exam in June at the
last year of their senior high school study. The subjects of Chinese, Mathematics and En-
glish language are compulsory in most provinces, but other subjects may change across
provinces. Generally, the students need to take their exam in the region where their
hukou is registered, most of the migrant children thus have to return to their hometown
before the Gaokao.
Besides entering university, a person may get a city hukou (so do their descendants in
the future) through the process of urbanization.
Therefore, migrant parents’ decisions are not only important for their own welfare,
but also essential for their children’s future (the short-run effects) as well as their future
descendant’s economic potential (the long-run effects).
It is worth to notice that the current setting of human capital and wealth accumulation
dynamics of Chinese internal migrants is similar to the seminal contribution of Galor and
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Zeira (1993) and Galor and Omer (2004), where parents’ wealth and bequest play roles in
determining the long-run equilibrium of the economy. In their studies, the parents’ be-
quest may limit children’s ability to borrow from the credit market and hence constraint
their chances of educational investment. The current study differs from their contribu-
tion in the following two aspects: (1) Chinese internal migrants usually do not rely on the
financial credit market because of the limitation and imperfection of Chinese credit mar-
ket, rather they rely on their own income to invest in their children’s education; (2) we
do not investigate from the perspective of macroeconomics, we rather focus only on the
offspring of the current migrant workers by assuming that the Chinese macroeconomic
environment, especially the hukou system, will not change in the short- and long-run.
This does not mean the long-run Chinese macroeconomic study is not interesting, how-
ever, it is a very important topic and deserves a separated study.
2.4.2 Long-run Consequences
We start with the children with motivation to study, that is, Bj > 0, j = l,m. Following
the theoretical finding in Figure 2.1, there are four possible outcomes from parents’ deci-
sions on where to locate their children and how to educate them: children are living in (a)
city with receiving private education, (b) city without taking private education, (c) rural
hometown with private education, or (d) rural hometown with no private education.
We denote that children who get private education have probabilities pj ∈ (0, 1) (j =
l,m) to enter university. If they do not get any private education, the probabilities of
entering university are qj ∈ (0, 1), j = l,m, depending on whether they are left behind
or migrant children. Mathematically, for j = l,m, the probability of going to university,
which is measured only on final scores of the entrance exam, checks
P
(
hjt+1 − h0 = Bjt (θj + ejt )ηhα
j
t (h
j
t )
κ ≥ h∗
)
=
 p
j , if ejt > 0,
qj , if ejt = 0,
where h∗ is the lowest level to enter university.10
By assuming that the public schools in the city are better than the ones in the rural
village, then with private investment in education, we can impose that
pm > pl, qm > ql.
10Different universities have different entry requirements. Even in the same university, the
entry levels may differ among the original regions of the students.
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However, it is hard to justify the magnitude between pl and qm, even though we assume
that education in the city is better than the one in rural areas, however, migrant children
may not have advantage over the left behind who receive private education, because
many migrant children who study in a different province from the province where the
hukou is registered, they have to return to their hometown to take Gaokao, the subjects
of which may differ.
Due to the urbanization process, migrant children have probability τ ∈ (0, 1) of getting
a city hukou during their childhood.
Combining two channels together, migrant children who receive private education
have the probability τ + pm to get a city hukou, and with the probability of 1 − τ − pm
that they stay with holding a rural hukou. While for migrant children who do not receive
private education, the chance to remain a rural hukou is 1 − τ − qm. Considering these
children grow up in the city instead of their original rural villages, they will remain as
migrants just like their parents.
For the left behind children, children who take private education are more likely to
enter the university ( (pl − ql > 0). Otherwise, they will remain holding a rural hukou
and grow up in the rural hometown. They will face the same decision as their parents
that whether go to cities to pursue a job or stay in the countryside. If they decide to
migrate, they will face the same dilemma as their parents: Where will they locate their
children - leave them behind or take them, provide them with private education or not?
For those children with no motivation to study, that is Bj = 0(j = l,m), as demon-
strated previously, the parents do not have a choice on their education. It is unlikely for
these children to go to university. Nevertheless, if they migrate with their parents to the
city, they have the same probability to obtain a city hukou as the other migrant children
via the process of urbanization. Otherwise, they remain their rural hukou status and
work as their migrant parents. For the left behind non-motivated children, they stay in
rural areas and need to make the same decisions or choices as their parents have made.
We use the tree in Figure 2.2 to illustrate the above dynamics of hukou/skills changing
over generations.
The above analysis demonstrates that migrant children taking private education have
much more chances to obtain city hukou or get better paid jobs than the rest of the chil-
dren. Therefore, if the current migrant workers take into account not only their children’s
human capital accumulation (short-run), but also their future descendants’ economic po-
tential (long-run), the optimal choice should take the children to migrate and provide
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Figure 2.2: Dynamics of Migrants’ hukou change
them with private education. Figure 2.1 also shows that decision depends on the rela-
tively income. The ones, at the upper-left-corner of Figure 2.1, who have relatively high
educational income and can afford to take their children to migrate and offer them with
private education, their children will be better off than the other children. Thus, the in-
equality among different migrant families are increased over a few generations. But, if
low income parents value more for their children’s education than parents with relatively
high income, the inequality situation may change over time.
Nevertheless, studying the macroeconomic environment and the long-run distribu-
tion of the Chinese economy is beyond the current study.
2.5 Conclusion Remarks
The aim of this chapter is to provide answers to the following questions: Where should
Chinese internal migrant parents locate their children - leave them behind or take them
to migrate? How should they invest in their children’s education?
Even though migrant parents would like to take their children with them, however,
for many families, this good wish become impossible. Therefore, leaving their children
behind in their hometown becomes a rational choice.
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The originality of our study is that our model demonstrates that the decision of mi-
grant workers’ on their children’s location relies on the relocation cost of children’s mi-
gration. The relocation cost depends on the cost such as extra school fees charged on
them due to the constraint of hukou as well as educational development gaps between
rural and urban regions. The larger the educational gap between rural and urban ar-
eas, the higher is the relocation cost threshold. Therefore, to facilitate the process of
children migrating with their parents, some basic child-related policies and infrastruc-
ture are needed. These policy include reducing the educational gap between the regions
where migrants register and the cities to which they migrate, diminishing school fees
and providing public health care for migrant children or removing the barriers of chil-
dren migration so as to decrease the relocation cost of migrant workers migrating with
their children.
Furthermore, providing children with extra private education to complement the pub-
lic school not only affects children’s human capital accumulation but also influences the
economic potential of their descendants in the future. The provision of private educa-
tion relies on the comparison between educational investment of migrant parents and
the public educational input.
The educational investment is defined as lifetime income multiplied by the education-
consumption ratio, and the lifetime income also includes potential remittance from chil-
dren in the future. The inequality can be decreased if the low income migrant parents
value more for their children’s education than the high income ones. Nonetheless, if all
parents care equally for their children’s education, inequality increases over generations.
It is worth noting that our theoretical results are based on a tractable model that ig-
nores many economic and non-economic effects of Chinese internal migration, for exam-
ple, we do not take into account the pension system at origin and at destination. Nev-
ertheless, omitting these effects allows us to focus on the main concerns of the migrants
workers. Future work could account for the extensions of which including the macroe-
conomic impacts of migrant workers. Especially, we should forecast and estimate the
gain and lost in GDP when these left-behind and migrant children enter the job mar-
ket. One possible further study is in line with the framework of Galor and Zeira (1993),
but including migrant worker and original city residents together, to study the long-run
distribution of wealth and inequality among all population. Furthermore, with the avail-
ability of new data, further empirical investigation may be implemented.
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Chapter 3
Are There School Performance
Differences between Chinese
Internal Migrants’ Children?
3.1 Introduction
In first chapter, it is said that in 2013, for Chinese internal migrant workers’ children,
there are 61 million children left behind, among which more than three percent (that is,
more than 2.1 millions) live alone. The others migrate with their parents, the proportion
of which is one out of three in urban areas, amounting to a staggering 35.81 million.
Considering an individual can draw on free public education, only in the place of
registration, though there are more educational resources in cities than that in rural areas,
because of hukou restriction, there is no guarantee that educational outcome of children
migrating to the city is better than children who are left in the rural village. In this chapter,
we estimate the effect of location on school performance of migrant worker’ children.
When migrating to the city, children may either attend makeshift private migrant
schools, which often lack adequate teachers, or pay high fees in order to be admitted to
public schools (Liu et al., 2015, Lu and Zhang, 2004, Wang and Holland, 2011, Wong et al.,
2007). Public schools prefer urban children to migrant children because the government
subsidies they receive are solely based on the number of local children enrolled. Schools
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may boost their revenue by charging extra fees and require donations from migrant par-
ents, with amounts proportional to the schools’ academic reputation. This strong incen-
tive to maintain high academic standards, together with the often-held view of migrant
children as being academically inferior, leads public schools to set up obstacles to ad-
mitting migrant children (Chan and Crothall, 2009). Migrant children thus often attend
mediocre or low quality schools, even if they have been living in their host cities for many
years.
The hukou system influences not only migrant children’s enrollment in public schools,
but also their results in Gaokao, the National College Entrance Examination. Children
take this test in June of their last year of senior high school. Chinese and Math are manda-
tory subjects in all provinces, English is also commonly tested, but provinces may also
add other subjects. As children are supposed to take this exam in the their hukou reg-
istration place, migrant workers’ might find themselves tested in subjects they have not
studied in the cities where they migrated. This means that even if migrant children suc-
cessfully enrolled in better quality public urban schools, they may be disadvantaged in
the Gaokao exam.
Considering these interactions between hukou system and the Gaokao policy, it is not
obvious whether a rural or an urban compulsory schooling is preferable for children of
migrant parents.
There have been growing number of studies on the impact of parental absence on
school performance or school attainment of children in rural areas. Using data from
north-eastern provinces of Hebei and Liaoning, Meyerhoefer and Chen (2011) find that
parental migration is associated with a lag in grade-level attainment for left behind chil-
dren compared with other rural non-left behind children, especially for girls. Lu (2012),
Zhang et al. (2014), Zhao et al. (2014), Meng and Yamauchi (2015) and Lu et al. (2016)
conclude that parental migration significantly lowers the grades of left-behind children
relative to children whose parents have not migrated.
Notwithstanding, no consensus has been reached on the studies of educational gap
between migrant and rural children. Comparing the test scores of children in migrant
schools in Beijing with the test scores of children in Shaanxi’s rural public schools, Lai
et al. (2014) conclude that among fourth-grade students, migrant students outperform
those in rural public schools. In contrast, Wang et al. (2017) find evidence showing that
the fifth grade students in rural public school perform better in Math test scores than
migrant counterparts in private migrate school in the city.
The existing studies on Chinese migrant workers’ children mainly do comparative
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analysis among young children in primary school. With the educational and psycholog-
ical literature, however, parental effects on children’s school performance are likely to be
stronger when children are in primary school and to weaken as children grow older (En-
twisle and Hayduk, 1982, 1988, Topor et al., 2010). The objective of this chapter, therefore,
is to test whether this hypothesis is robust for the school performance between migrant
and left behind children in China. By exploiting the 2009 Rural Urban Migration survey
in China, the baseline finding is that, on average, Chinese test scores of migrant children
are better than children who are left-behind in the rural village. We further demonstrate
that this advantage of migrant children depends on the age of children: young children
being schooled in cities show better results than their left behind peers, yet no such ad-
vantage exists at the level of junior high school.
Though much efforts being made, these results need to be interpreted with caution.
Selection of children into a migrating or left-behind group may be endogenous, it may
depend on some unobserved variables that cannot be controlled for. Nonetheless, this
findings are consistent with educational literature that parents’ involvement are posi-
tively related to young children’s school performance (Entwisle and Hayduk, 1982, 1988,
Topor et al., 2010).
The rest of chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the large-scale survey
of internal migrants in China and Section 3.3 presents the empirical analysis strategy and
results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 The Data
Nationwide data collection regarding internal migrants in China is made very challeng-
ing by the geographical scale and temporary nature of the migration, the sheer number
of persons concerned as well as the usual difficulties in defining and tracking migrants,
especially unregistered migrants. However, the recent large-scale Migrant Household
Survey (MHS), drawing on a random sample of rural-to-urban migrant households from
the five provinces which are the largest source of migrants in China and the four most
common destination provinces 1 allows some interesting insights on the outcomes of Chi-
1The sample covers 15 cities in nine provinces: Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, An-
hui, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqing and Henan. According to the 2000 Census, two-thirds of migrant
workers in China have chosen as destination cities in the provinces of Shanghai, Guangdong,
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nese internal migration. The survey design and implementation are described in detail
by (Kong, 2010).
The MHS is one of the three independent surveys forming the Rural Urban Migra-
tion in China (RUMiC) survey 2. It has been initiated in 2006 by a group of universities
comprising the Australian National University, the University of Queensland and Bei-
jing Normal University as a longitudinal survey following migrant households for a pe-
riod of five years. The MHS targeted the population of migrants who were registered
in a rural area but lived in an urban area at the time when the survey started in 2008
(Kong, 2010).Considering these workers usually live in factory dormitories or makeshift
accommodations, a sampling frame was not readily available. Instead, the survey first
randomly selected workplaces within defined city boundaries and subsequently migrant
workers in each workplace were randomly chosen based on their birth months. Face-to-
face interviews with the selected workers and the members of their households3 living
in the city were performed.
The MHS questionnaires collect rich information on demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of migrant workers, their household members in the city as well as their
spouses and children who stayed behind in the home village. Parents or custodians pro-
vided answers concerning many types of expenditures, including those for education, as
well as test scores obtained in school by children who were younger than 16 years old
and children who were older than 16 but still in school. Parents can be assumed to have
good knowledge of their children’s scores because at the end of each semester they attend
a parents meeting and the final test scores are also sent to parents in writing (see Meng
and Yamauchi (2015) for more detail).
Despite considerable efforts of the surveying team, 64% of households could no longer
be tracked after the first wave (Akgüç et al., 2014). This substantial attrition rate prevents
us from relying on the panel dimension of the MHS. We exploit only the second wave
of the MHS because at present it is the only publicly available wave in which scores
obtained by children in school have been collected. In early 2009, 5243 households were
interviewed. They had a total of 3116 children, of which 1219 children were too young
Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 47% of migrant workers stem from the Sichuan, Chongqing, Anhui, Hubei
and Henan provinces (Akgüç et al., 2014).
2The financial support for RUMiC was obtained from the Australian Research Council, the
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Ford Foundation, IZA and the
Chinese Foundation of Social Sciences. The two other surveys in the RUMiC project are the Urban
Household Survey (UHS) and the Rural Household Survey (RHS).
3A household was defined as anyone who was living with the respondent at the time of the
survey, sharing income and expenditure.
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to attend school and 1897 were aged between 6 and 16 or were older than 16 but still
in school. 148 school-aged children who already obtained a local urban hukou were
excluded from the analysis, as were the 394 children for whom Math or Chinese scores
were not recorded (46 had dropped out of school altogether).
In explaining test scores earned by the children in school, selection bias may occur if
children earning high scores continue education beyond the nine years of compulsory
education whereas lower achieving students leave school to seek jobs. We thus restricted
our analysis to children enrolled in compulsory education, i.e. enrolled in primary and
junior high school. Our sample thus consists of 789 children with complete information4,
of which 415 are migrant children and 374 are left-behind children. Children whose pri-
mary residence the year before the survey was a rural village are considered left-behind
children and those living in the city in the same period are defined as migrant children.
We measure school performance by the test scores earned by children both in Math
and in Chinese language because these two are main subjects taught and tested in every
grade of the 9-year compulsory education in accordance with the National Curriculum
Standard designed by the Ministry of Education. The contents of the tests in each region
must follow the National Curriculum Standard (Meng and Yamauchi, 2015), allowing
comparability across provinces of China. It is widely accepted they provide a good mea-
sure of overall school performance of children (Chen et al., 2009, Zhao et al., 2014). As
schools in China may use different scales in grading children’s performance, we ensure
comparability across schools by analysing not the raw Math and Chinese scores but stan-
dardized scores, determined as the ratio of the actual scores obtained to the maximum
test score possible in the school for Math and Chinese respectively. The maximum scores
were reported by the parents in the RUMiC data.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.1. The proportion of 58% boys in the sam-
ple is slightly high, but one should keep in mind in the Chinese population the sex-ratio
also tends to be high (in 2005 it was estimated by China’s National Bureau of Statistics at
54.25% (UNICEF, 2014)) and that in the rural population from which the migrants emerge
the share of boys is known to be even higher (it was at 54.89% at the time of the 2000 cen-
sus (Wang et al., 2006)). We find no evidence of a preference for migrating with sons, as
had been reported in previous literature (for example, (Chen and Feng, 2013)).
4Observations with missing information on explanatory variables are excluded.
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Migrant and left-behind children are similar in age and are equally likely to be only
children. Almost half of the children in our sample are not the only child in the house-
hold. While this might seem inconsistent with the one-child policy China has long im-
plemented, it is not surprising since the one-child policy has always allowed households
holding a rural hukou to have a second child if their first child was a girl. In certain
regions a family could also pay a so-called "social compensation fee" in order to have a
second child.
Educational expenditure is the sum of private educational cost, regular living cost
and school fees and sponsorship fees, that is the educational related cost. These private
educational cost were collected under the heading “remedial costs outside of school" in
the questionnaire of MHS and they correspond to cram school expenses. Cram schools
provide extra classes for children in the evenings, weekends or school holidays with the
stated aim of improving their school test scores. Parents who migrated with their chil-
dren are more likely to spend on private education and spend on average three times
more on private education than those who left their children behind. Regular living and
school fees, consisting of expenses for food, accommodation and remedial classes taken
in school, are similar for families who left children behind and those who migrate with
children. Although China passed a law in 2008 that barred schools from charging par-
ents with extra fees for simply accepting to enrol their children, many schools continued
to demand such fees in the form of donations, called “sponsorship fees" in the MHS
questionnaire. Because children with rural hukou do not have a right to enroll in urban
schools, parents who have migrated with their children are more likely to incur such fees.
Indeed, 28% of migrant parents reported having paid such sponsorship fees compared to
only 5% of migrants who have left children behind.
In spite of these differences in sponsorship fees paid, the parents’ perception of the
quality of the school their children attend is the same whether the children are left-behind
or migrant. More than two thirds of parents consider their children attend “average or
below" quality schools and slightly more than one quarter think their children are en-
rolled in “better than average" schools. Only 4% of parents report their migrant children
attend schools of “the best" quality, which confirms the difficulties migrant children have
in accessing good quality education in their destination cities. Yet among parents who
left children behind the proportion who think their children are enrolled in “the best"
quality schools is only slightly higher, at 6%.
Household income is the total income earned by family members living in the destina-
tion city. The income of families migrating with children are 19% higher than the families
where children are left-behind. Consistent with our hypotheses, migrant parents remit
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almost 40% more on average if their children are left-behind.
As expected, migrant parents themselves have only gained limited education: only
15% of fathers and 10% of mothers have high school education or above. For left-behind
children it is most often the mother that raises the child, so her education level is par-
ticularly important for the children’s learning. In families migrating with children, the
proportions of higher educated fathers/mothers are slightly higher than among families
where children are left-behind.
In order to control for possible regional differences in children’s school performance,
we introduce a set of dummies indicating the origin of migrant children and the area
where left-behind children live. Ideally province-level dummies would have been used,
but insufficient observations have led us to distinguish just three regions: a Central re-
gion, a Coastal region and the region of Western China. Half of the children in our sample
come from the Central provinces of China, which is not surprising, because central China
is at the same time less developed than the east-coast and not too far removed from the
urban east-coastal areas to allow migration. Western areas are poorer than central ones,
but migration from those areas is hindered by the vast distances migrants would have to
travel away from home. Close to 30% of the children stem from Western areas.
Chinese and Math test scores are higher than expected, with migrant children scor-
ing on average 86% of the maximum score and left-behind children scoring on average
83.6% of the full score. One possible explanation is the case that, at the compulsory ed-
ucation stage, it is generally easier for children to obtain higher test scores. The gap in
Math test scores between two groups is minor, but the unconditional difference in mean
Chinese test scores is 2.4 percentage point in favor of migrant children. The magnitude in
Chinese test scores difference between two groups seems to be small. Nevertheless, the
examination is very competitive in China, especially for the National College Entrance
Examination (Gaokao). It is estimated that there were over 9 million 5 candidates in 2017
attending Gaokao. The test scores of students in the exam determine the type and status
of universities to be selected (Davey et al., 2007). Therefore, the small difference in test
scores can fluctuate a student’s ranking in the exam and change the course of his life.
5The figure comes from an online source: http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/
2017-06/06/c_136344855.htm.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Migrant children Left-behind children All children
Mean Mean Mean Min Max
Standardized test scores
Chinese 0.860 0.836 0.849 0.24 1
(0.106) (0.121) (0.114)
Mathematics 0.868 0.855 0.862 0.20 1
(0.118) (0.120) (0.119)
Age of children 10.877 11.345 11.099 6 18
(2.87) (2.91) (2.90)
Grade of children 4.52 5.01 4.75 1 9
(2.50) (2.54) (2.53)
Proportion of boys 0.58 0.59 0.58
Proportion of households with an only child 0.470 0.409 0.441
Educational expenditure 2.04 1.45 1.76 0 18.30
(2.38) 2.23 2.33
of which
Private education cost 0.112 0.037 0.077 0 4.50
(0.438) (0.223) (0.357)
Regular living and school fees 1.44 1.33 1.39 0 15
(1.87) (2.00) (1.93)
Having paid a sponsorship fee 0.282 0.045 0.170
( 1= having paid a sponsorship fee; 0 otherwise)
Household income 38.97 31.76 35.56 7.20 12
(20.30) ( 17.03) ( 19.15)
Remittance 3.83 5.31 4.53 0 50
(6.16) (6.49) (6.36)
Perceived quality of school
Average or below 0.680 0.676 0.678
Better than average 0.282 0.259 0.271
The best 0.039 0.064 0.051
Father’s level of education 0.159 0.139 0.150
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise)
Mother’s level of education 0.104 0.088 0.096
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise)
Region of origin
Central 0.523 0.484 0.504
Coastal 0.198 0.222 0.209
Western 0.280 0.294 0.286
Observations 415 374 789
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2009. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Educational expenditure, private education cost, regular living
and school fees, household income and remittance are measured in thounsands of RMB per year. The Coastal region includes the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong,
Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The Central region inlcudes migrants from the provinces of Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Jiangxi and Shanxi. The Western region regroups Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichan, Xinjiang and Yunan.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
The baseline model is written as:
Sih = α+ β1Mh + βkXkih + ih, (3.1)
where Sih stands for the standardized Chinese or Math test scores of child i in house-
hold h. Mh is equal to 1 if children in household h are migrant and 0 if they are left-
behind. Xkih is a vector of k control variables refering to characteristics of children,
parents, households and region of origin, such as gender and age of the children, the
perceived quality of the school children attend, yearly household expenditures on edu-
cation, amount remitted per year etc.. ih is the error term.
The migration status of the children in the sample varies across households6. We
report standard errors clustered at the household level to correct for the fact that children
within the same household are expected to have more similar school performances than
children chosen at random from the population. The error term ih is assumed to be
independent across households.
3.3.2 Empirical Results
Table 3.2 reports baseline regression parameter estimates. The results show that migra-
tion has a significant impact on the Chinese scores. Migrant children significantly outper-
form left-behind children by 1.9 percentage point, after controlling for individual, family
and region characteristics. The magnitude is slightly narrowed compared to the uncon-
ditional Chinese score gap reported in Table 3.1. In terms of standardized Math score, the
advantage of migrant children is not statistically significant.
In Eq.3.1, β1 captures migrant/left-behind children school performance gap after con-
trolling for their individual, family and region characteristics, but according to existing
experimental and empirical studies, parental effects on children’s school performance are
likely to be stronger when children are in primary school and to weaken as children grow
older (Entwisle and Hayduk, 1982, 1988, Topor et al., 2010). In other words, at different
6Only 4 households in our sample report having migrated with some children and left others
behind.
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Table 3.2: Baseline regression results for school performance in Chinese and Math
Standardised Chinese scores Standardised Math scores
(1) (2)
Migrant children 0.019 (0.009)∗∗ 0.005 (0.009)
Age −0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗ −0.008 (0.002)∗∗∗
Boys −0.023 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.009 (0.008)
Only child 0.002 (0.008) 0.005 (0.009)
Educational expenditure 0.000 (0.002) −0.000 (0.002)
household income 0.000 (0.0002) 0.001 (0.000)∗∗
Perceived quality of School (ref: Average or below)
Better than average 0.033 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.044 (0.009)∗∗∗
Best 0.068 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.069 (0.017)∗∗∗
Father’s level of education −0.002 (0.011) −0.005 (0.012)
Mother’s level of education 0.020 (0.010)∗ 0.015 (0.011)
Region dummies yes yes
Number of household clusters 609 609
Observations 789 789
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2009. Notes: Educational expenditure is the sum of private education cost, regular
living and school fees and sponsorship fees. Standard errors in parentheses correct for clustering at the household level.
All regressions include the constants.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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ages school performance gap between two groups may go different directions and can-
cel each other out in overall sample. In order to explore whether migrant/left-behind
children school performance differential varys across the age, following the technique of
Case et al. (2002) who study the impacts of household income on the health of children at
different ages, we therefore interact migration status of children Mh with the age Ageih,
the regression model is:
Sih = α+ β1Mh + β2Ageih + β3Mh ∗Ageih + βkXkih + ih, (3.2)
Table 3.3: Regression results for school performance in Chinese and Math
Standardised Chinese scores Standardised Math scores
(1) (2)
Migrant children 0.118 (0.035)∗∗∗ 0.113 (0.036)∗∗∗
Age −0.003 (0.002) −0.003 (0.002)
Migrant children * age −0.009 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.010 (0.003)∗∗∗
Boys −0.022 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.008 (0.008)
Only child 0.001 (0.008) 0.004 (0.009)
Educational expenditure −0.000 (0.002) −0.001 (0.002)
Household income 0.000(0.000) 0.001(0.000)∗∗
Perceived quality of School (ref: Average or below)
Better than average 0.032 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.043 (0.009)∗∗∗
Best 0.066 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.067 (0.017)∗∗∗
Father’s level of education −0.001 (0.011) −0.004 (0.011)
Mother’s level of education 0.018 (0.010)∗ 0.013 (0.011)
Region dummies yes yes
Number of household clusters 609 609
Observations 789 789
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2009. Notes: All regressions include the constants.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
When the interaction term is introduced, displayed in Table 3.3, the result is consis-
tent with the hypothesis. Ceteris paribus, migration has a significant impact both on
the Chinese score and the Math score that children obtain: at young ages migrant chil-
dren outperform left-behind children, but around at the end of the compulsory education
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this trend is reversed. Migrant children aged 6 have Chinese test scores on average 6.4
percentage points higher than the left-behind children of the same age, whereas among
migrants of age 16 the left-behind earn Chinese test scores on average 2.6 percentage
points higher than their migrant counterparts. Math scores are on average 5.4 percent-
age points higher among migrants of age 6 than among left-behind children of the same
age. Among 16 year-old, the left-behind score 4.6 percentage points higher in Math than
the migrant children. For children of age 13, the Chinese test score is the same whether
children migrate to the city or are left-behind.
Regarding the effects of control variables, the perceived quality of the school substan-
tially improves both Chinese and Math scores. Girls’ scores in Chinese are 2.0 percentage
points higher on average than those of boys, but no differences exist regarding Math
scores.
Only the mother’s education level influences the children’s Chinese test scores. A
father’s with high education does not improve Chinese scores and Math scores of his
children. This might be the consequence of Chinese migrant workers having to work
very long hours 7, leaving them too little time for helping their children study.
To gauge robustness of our result that the differences in school performance between
migrant children and left-behind children are age related, we further divide children into
two groups on the basis of their grade, i.e. children in primary school and children in
junior high school, we then repeat our analysis in each group. The results in Table 3.4
indicate that, in the group of primary school, migrant children are outperforming left-
behind children in both Chinese and Math subjects. After controlling for all other vari-
ables, Chinese and Math test scores of migrant children are 3.1 percentage points and 2.6
percentage point, respectively, higher than left-behind counterparts. Concerning children
in the junior high school, there is no statistically significant discrepancy in Chinese test
scores, Math scores of left-behind however are 5.1 percentage point higher than migrant
children. This is consistent with the findings drawn on in Table 3.3, at young ages of chil-
dren, migrant ones get the advantage of school performance over left-behind children
while this advantage is weaken among children in the junior high school.
The above analysis concludes that young migrant children’s school performance are
better than those left-behind. But this trend is reversed for junior high school children.
Though the precise reason for this result is not known, one possible explanation is that
7Migrants worked on average 25.2 days a month an 8.7 hours a day in 2015. 85 percent of them
worked in excess of 44 hours per week. See China Labour Bulletin at http://www.clb.org.
hk/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children.
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Table 3.4: Results for children in primary school and in junior high school
Dependent variable:
Primary School Junior high School
Chinese Math Chinese Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant children 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.051∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.018)
Age 0.0004 0.001 −0.005 −0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Boys −0.015 0.003 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.032∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)
Only child 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.0001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
Educational expenditure 0.004∗ 0.002 −0.0005 −0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household income 0.000 0.0002 0.0009∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
( 0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.004)
Perceived quality of School (ref: Average or below)
Better than average 0.034∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.028 0.052∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
Best 0.054∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
Father’s level of education −0.002 −0.007 0.009 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023)
Mother’s level of education 0.021∗ 0.020∗ 0.012 −0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.024)
Region dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 552 552 237 237
Number of household clusters: 504 504 221 221
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2009. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses correct for clustering at the household level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Each regression includes a constant.
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it is harder for adolescence to adjust to the new environment than for younger children.
Therefore, some unobserved factors may pull down migrant children’s school perfor-
mance. Constraint by data, analysing this effect is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Nonetheless, if children are too young that migrant parents have to be involved in their
young children’s school activities, parental involvement may counteract negative effect
trigged by unequal treatment in the city. As children’s age increasing, migrants parents,
due to heavy work schedules, spend less time taking care of their children even if their
children migrate with them, therefore, migrant children’s advantage being with parents
weakened.
3.3.3 Further Discussion
Based on the above analysis, concerning children’s school performance, young migrant
children behave much better than left-behind children, but this trend is reverted among
children in junior high school. Nevertheless, much caution is needed in interpreting the
estimated effects of children’s migration on test scores for several reasons. The parents
decision to migrate with a child or to leave him or her in the home village may depend
on the school performance of the child, creating a problem of reverse causality. Impor-
tant determinants of the school performance such as the general ability of children or
their study effort are unobserved, yet they may be correlated with the migration status
of the children and causing our estimates to be both biased and inconsistent. Selection
bias may also affect our results, as for a non-negligible share of children in the sample the
Math and Chinese scores are not reported. In the Chinese context it can be assumed that
some parents might feel ashamed to report a low school performance for their children
and might prefer to simply not answer the survey question. If such a pattern was indeed
followed in reporting test scores, the average of test scores would be overestimated and
the variance of the test scores reduced. Finally, test scores as well as educational expendi-
ture and household income are likely plagued by measurement error. Minimum values
of these variables are surprisingly low, which contrasts to the general idea that children of
wealthier parents generally receive more and better schooling (Bowles and Gintis, 2002,
Case et al., 2002).
Despite these problems, our findings are in line with educational and psychologic lit-
erature that child’s academic success has been found to be positively related to parents’
involvement in children’s early school education(Entwisle and Hayduk, 1988, Hara and
Burke, 1998, Hill and Craft, 2003, Topor et al., 2010). Furthermore, using the same sur-
vey, Meng and Yamauchi (2015) also find an evidence that parental involvement has a
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positive effect on their children’s Chinese and Math test scores in rural villages in China.
By exploiting the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) and the Rural–Urban Migration in
China (RUMiC) survey, Zhang et al. (2015) reach the similar conclusion by comparing the
educational performance of rural children, children of rural-to-urban migrants, and local
urban children.
For the current study, the mechanisms through which this positive influence of mi-
grant parents on their young children’s school performances may not be an endogenous
process. Taking care of young children, who are too young to take care of themselves,
may indirectly provide chances for parents’ involvement in their young children’s school
activities. While with the children’s age increasing, the busy working parents are less
involved in their children school activities, hence the migrant children’s advantage being
with parents weakened.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The novelty of this current study is showing that there are school performance differences
between left-behind and migrant children. By using large-scale Migrant Household Sur-
vey Data that was collected in nine provinces in China, we examine school performance
of these migrant workers’ children. Comparing test scores of children having migrated
to the city to those of children having left-behind, we conclude that migrant children
outperforms left-behind children, especially for Chinese test scores.
This chapter explores age effect on the school performance differential: at young ages
of children, migrant children have significant advantage over their left-behind counter-
parts in rural hometown, but among children who are in junior high school, math test
score of left-behind children is higher than that of migrant children.
Beyond the classical idea of facilitating the procedures of migrant children being en-
rolled in urban pubic school and increasing investment on the migrant children’s ed-
ucation, our findings also suggest that policy maker could regulate migrant workers’
working time and protect parental time of taking care their school age children.
Because of data limitation, especially the high mobility of migrant workers, further
empirical (and theoretical) studies are needed before more proper policy can be recom-
mended. “Take your child with you to migrate” is one of the suggestions from scholars
to the migrant job seeking parents. However, in Chinese case, the reality is far more
complicated than this simple slogan.
49

Chapter 4
Private Educational
Expenditure Inequality
between Migrant and Urban
Households in China’s Cities
4.1 Introduction
China’s spatially unequal economic development motivates many Chinese parents to
move from rural to urban areas and from poorer cities to more affluent ones. In their
endeavor to secure a better life for their children, migrant households have an incentive
to invest into their offspring’s education. The amount they invest is doubly constrained:
on the one hand the household income caps what households can afford to spend, and
on the other hand, administrative hurdles hampering the enrollment of their children in
free public schools spurs education-related costs for them. By comparing educational
expenditure of migrant households to that of local residents, this chapter aims to shed
light on whether the taste of migrant parents for educating their children differs from
that of local residents in China’s cities.
In the wake of Becker’s seminal 1963 book introducing the human capital theory, a vast
economic literature has established that investment in education and training increases
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productivity and labor market earnings (Becker, 1993). It is especially high school and
university level education that has been shown to increase individuals’ subsequent earn-
ings. Thus it is rational for parents, whether migrants or locals, to invest so that their
children achieve the highest level of education they can afford.
In the Chinese context, admission to university is decided primarily by the ranking of
pupils’ scores in the National College Entrance Examination, known as Gaokao. Pupils
may participate in the Gaokao after graduating from 3 years of non-compulsory senior
high school education. Enrollment in senior high school education is itself conditioned
by the successful completion of 9 years of compulsory education (the first six of which
are considered primary education, the subsequent ones constituting junior high school
education).
The types of costs incurred by families to educate their children depend on the level
of education their offspring is attending, on the household’s official registration status
(hukou), as well as on the choice of school that families make. According to Compulsory
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, enacted in 1986, no tuition may be
charged to pupils enrolling in compulsory education at the public school situated in the
neighborhood of their official (hukou) residence. Private schools are however free to set
tuition fees as they see fit, irrespective of the level of education they offer. Some private
schools are able to charge tuition fees because they provide better education than local
public schools, catering especially to pupils residing officially in cities. However other
private schools offer poorer education, but are able to extract tuition fees from migrant
families who lack a local hukou and whose children are consequently barred from free
public education.
So-called "sponsorship" or "school selection" fees may be demanded of households
who want their child to join a public school other than the nearby school. Families hold-
ing a local hukou may choose not to enroll their offspring in the public nearby school
presumably because the local school’s quality is deemed unsatisfactory. Migrant fami-
lies, the vast majority of whom do not have a local hukou in the city they migrated to, are
charged sponsorship fees or are forced to offer "donations" to the public schools where
they register their children, mirroring tuition fees that are demanded by private schools.
Sponsorship fees tend to be higher in more affluent cities (Zhang, 2017) and they are far
from insignificant: according to Goodburn (2009), a child without a local residence per-
mit in Beijing was required to pay per term extra fees ranging from RMB 1200($175) to
more than RMB 8000 ($1167).
Education-related expenditures also arise for households from the hiring of private
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tutors, a practice which is very common in China’s cities regardless of the educational
level attended by the pupils. Zhang and Liu (2016) estimate that in 2004 around 74 %
of students in elementary schools, 66 % of junior high school students and 54 % of se-
nior high school students in urban China received private tutoring. Many parents see
academic private tutoring as a supplement to school-provided education that can en-
hance the chances of admission to (most prestigious) universities. Private tutoring is
often provided by teachers as one-to-one instruction tailored to the needs of the indi-
vidual pupil, but also in the form of optional after-school classes aimed to consolidate
the lessons learned in class or as optional supplementary classes in cram schools, whose
stated aim is to improve the children’s test scores in school. Private tutoring also extends
to non-academic skills, since mastering foreign languages and having artistic or athletic
skills also count among the acceptance criteria used by prestigious higher education in-
stitutions.
Finally a more modest category of education-related expenditures borne by house-
holds spring from buying books and other school material, uniforms, food provided at
the school, etc. The 2015 version of the Law on Compulsory Education stipulates that
only slim profits may be drawn in China from selling textbooks used in public schools
(OECD, 2016).
It is apparent from the above depiction of the broad categories of education-related
costs that households dwelling in China’s cities must sustain possibly very different lev-
els of investment in order for their children to reach to the same level of educational
achievement. Households’ total education-related expenditure can be expected to in-
crease with expected private returns to education. Since some evidence suggests that
private returns to education are smaller for migrant households than for non-migrant
households (Yao et al., 2018), migrant households are expected to invest less than urban
households. The total spending gap might at the same time be narrowed by virtue of
the hukou policy, which restricts the benefit of public spending on education solely to
urban households who enroll their children in nearby public schools and generates costs
for migrant families whose children join the same local public schools. The choice of pri-
vate or public schools by local and migrant households might both mitigate or enhance
the spending gap: richer households may choose to pay for good quality private or pub-
lic schooling instead of contenting themselves with the local free public school, whereas
migrants may turn unwillingly to low quality private schools simply because they are
unable to afford attending the public schools.
By comparing the total education-related expenditures of households holding a local
city hukou to that of households lacking a local hukou, we assess the net effect of both
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household’s choices and the impact of the administrative hurdles they face. A subsequent
comparison of migrant families holding a local hukou with urban families could be con-
sidered to better reflect the tastes of families, since institutional arrangements for these
families are the same. Beyond the analysis of total spending on education, comparisons
of the three broad categories of educational expenditures, namely tuition fees, sponsor-
ship fees and private tutoring fees allows us to gauge explanations for the patterns of
total spending we observe.
Drawing on the first wave of the Rural-Urban Migration Survey in China (RUMiC), we
show that migrant households with children migrating to cities have higher educational
expenditure than urban households, after controlling for social and economic character-
istics. It appears from the more detailed analysis of subcategories of educational expen-
diture that migrant households spend large amounts on tuition and sponsorship, which
are a consequence of the hukou policy. Private tutoring expenditure on the other hand is
much larger for urban households. The comparison among households having the same
hukou status and differing in migration background leads to the conclusion that the lat-
ter spend less than the former. Tuition expenditure is lower for permanent migrants than
for urban local households but the opposite is true for sponsorship and no differences are
observed for private tutoring expenditure.
The rest of chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines a theoretical frame-
work. Section 4.3 describes the data and the descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 presents the
empirical strategy. The results are discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 compares the dif-
ference in educational expenditure between permanent migrant families and local urban
families. The last section concludes.
4.2 The Model
We consider only households living in urban China and their expenditure decision re-
garding children’s education. Suppose households of generation t, indexed by i (with
i = u indicating urban households and i = m being migrant households) differ in their
origin (and thus hukou status), in their human capital endowment hit and in their taste
children’s human capital accumulation.
Thus a household i at time t faces the following optimization problem:
max
eit
hit+1 =

µ [θu + gu(eut )]
η(hut )
α(ht)
(1−α), if i = u,
µ [gm(θm, emt )]
η(hmt )
α(ht)
(1−α), if i = m,
(4.1)
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which is a modification of the classical human capital accumulation formulation such as
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and de La Croix and Doepke (2003).
In equation (4.1), hit+1 is children’s human capital, ht is human capital of the teacher,
parameter µ > 0 is the productivity of children, which we assume to be the same for all
children, and η, α ∈ (0, 1). θu > 0 captures the facts that children with urban hukou en-
rolling in public schools gain human capital even without private education investment,
while θm ≥ 0 captures the situation that migrant children with rural hukou may not ben-
efit from the public education if private investment is absent. gi(eit) represents household
i’s private education investment which essentially depends on the hukou statute of the
household. Thus we can assume
gm(θm, 0) = 0 and gm(0, em,rt ) ≥ 0 if emt ≥ 0.
Obviously, this model can be easily solved via the standard first order condition, pro-
vided we know the private education investment functions, gu(eut ) and gm(θm, emt ). How-
ever, as mentioned by Yuan and Zhang (2015), some households’ investment in their
children’s education is a substitute to public spending, other household’s spending is a
complement to public spending and for some households expenditure is both a supple-
ment and a complement. Therefore, instead of solving as in Chapter 2 the straightforward
first order condition by assuming some given education investment functions, we devote
to the empirical test the differences among private education investment of households
with different hukou status.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study come from large-scale Urban Household Survey (UHS) and
Migrant Household Survey (MHS) for the year 2008. The UHS and MHS are two of
the three independent surveys forming the Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC)
survey. The two surveys, started in the early 2008, were carried out in 15 cities in 9
provinces : Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqing
and Henan. The sample of UHS was randomly drawn on the basis of urban residents’
permanent address, whereas the survey for migrants first randomly selected workplace
within defined boundary and subsequently migrant workers in each workplace were ran-
domly chosen based on their birth months1. Face-to-face interviews with the selected in-
1A detailed description of the sampling method for migrants is provided by Kong (2010) and
Akgüç et al. (2014).
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dividuals and the members of their households were performed. Households are defined
as persons living together at the time of the survey and sharing income and expenditure.
The questionnaires of both surveys collect rich information on demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of household members living in the city. Data on broad house-
hold expenditure categories is also collected. Parents or custodians declare the education-
related expenditure they incurred the year before the survey separately for each child.
Beside households’ total educational expenditure, we consider four categories of ex-
penditure related to education that were collected in the MHS and UHS. They are tuition
fees, private tutoring expenditure, sponsorship expenditure and other educational ex-
penditure (such as cost of school uniform, etc.). As described before, tuition fees are not
charged in the public schools during the period of compulsory education, private schools
may charge them. Expenditure for private tutoring at school and outside school is col-
lapsed together. School selection fees and donation fees are joined together and labeled
sponsorship expenditure. Migrant families without local city hukou have to pay spon-
sorship fees in order for their children be enrolled in public schools. Both migrant and
urban households pay donation fees or school selection fees if they want to register their
children in schools other than the neighboring public school.
The MHS and UHS cover 5007 and 5002 households respectively, of which 2159 mi-
grant households and 2748 urban households reported having at least one child who was
no older than 16 or was older than 16 but still in school. Our analysis is limited to the 632
households migrating with at least one child who is in education and the 1795 local urban
households with at least one child still studying2. Migrants in this chapter are defined as
individuals who did not hold the local city hukou at the time when the survey started.
For the main analyses we aggregated educational expenditure at the household level.
This is reasonable because of China’s one child policy, robustness checks represented in
section 4.4.3 show conclusions to be similar if individual level data are used 3.
We report as main empirical results the findings on absolute expenditure of house-
holds. But the conclusions we draw would not change if the budget share would be
2We excluded households with children that were younger than 6, older than 25 or aged be-
tween 16 and 25 but not in school. Children who had dropped out of school (26 urban children
and 9 migrant children) are not included. We also removed migrant households who left all their
children behind. 32 migrant households and 286 local urban households who had missing values
on our control variables were also dismissed.
3Only 28 migrant households in our sample reported having taken only one child and leaving
another behind.
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analyzed instead (see section 4.4.3).
Table 4.1 compares migrant and local urban households in terms of education-related
expenditure and income. The yearly total educational expenditure of households is on
average spend RMB 3232 ($471), significantly lower than RMB 3791 ($550) paid by local
urban residents. However, migrant’s expenditure on education constitutes a larger share
of their household income than local’s expenditure on education. Tuition fees account
for more than half of households’ total educational expenditure, both for migrant house-
holds (60%) and for local urban households (57%), but the difference is not significant at
the 1% significant level. The similar tuition fees paid by local and migrant parents are
most likely due to the fact that local parents prefer to pay tuition for admission in better
quality private schools (rather than free-charging public school) whereas migrants’ chil-
dren are rejected by public schools in destination cities and thus have no other choice
than paying tuition fees to private migrant schools.
Migrants allocate about RMB 363 (11% of their total expenditure) to private tutoring
and RMB 676 (20%) to sponsorship fees. The trend is opposite for local households, who
allocate about RMB 1064 (28%) to private tutoring and RMB 342 (9%) to sponsorship fees.
The sizable gap in private tutoring expenditure is accounted for especially by private tu-
toring expenditure outside school (cram schools, tutoring for private lessons etc.), where
local families invest almost five times as much as migrant ones. The lower expenditure
of migrants for private tutoring is mirrored by the higher sponsorship expenditure of
these households in comparison with local ones. The sponsorship expenditure of mi-
grant households is almost double.
No difference is observed in other educational expenditure among migrant and local
urban households.
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Table 4.1: Yearly educational expenditure and income by household hukou status
Households Local urban t-value
migrating with children households difference
Total educational expenditure 3233 3791 2.81
(3742) (5585)
of which
Tuition 1936 2175 1.53
(2647) (4928)
Private tutoring expenditure
Private tutoring expenditure at school 209 255 1.69
(498) (774)
Private tutoring expenditure outside school 154 809 13.72
(557) (1791)
Sponsorship expenditure 676 342 -3.51
(2198) (1560)
Other educational expenditure 266 210 -1.73
(569) (668)
Household income per capita 13085 19324 11.02
(10308) (16551)
Observations 632 1795
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Total educational expenditure,
tuition, private tutoring at school, private tutoring outside school, other educational expenditure and household income per capita are measured in RMB per
year. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance at 1% level.
Per capita household income of local urban residents is on average 1.5 times higher
than that of migrants. Panel A in Table 4.2 shows that more than half of migrant house-
holds cluster in the first two quintiles of the household income distribution and only 8%
of migrant households are in the top quintile. By contrast, a quarter of urban households
are in the top income quintile.
To gauge the relationship between educational expenditure and income, Panel B in Ta-
ble 4.2 displays the average educational expenditure of different types across the income
quintiles. As we move up in the income distribution, the total educational expenditure,
the tuition as well as the private tutoring expenses also increase. This pattern does not
hold true of sponsorship fees, which are higher in the first quintile than in the second
or in the fourth income quintile, suggesting that households may not be able to choose
sponsorship fees according to their income and must pay the fees fixed by schools (pro-
vided they afford them). Average expenditure on private tutoring for the families in the
richest quintile is about 4 times higher than that of the households in the bottom quintile,
whereas tuition fees are only about 2.2 times higher.
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Table 4.2: Average household educational expenditure across household income
quintiles
Income quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Panel A:
Share of households
Households migrating with children 0.324 0.217 0.223 0.155 0.081
Local urban households 0.157 0.194 0.192 0.216 0.242
Panel B:
Total educational expenditure 2393 3147 3430 3906 5354
(2878) (3930) (3631) (4009) (8735)
Tuition expenditure 1354 1890 1907 2388 3027
(1900) (3221) (2926) (3307) (8008)
Private tutoring expenditure 437 651 815 1003 1503
(1055) (1149) (1689) (1830) (2571)
Sponsorship expenditure 443 399 480 311 512
(1696) (1299) (1740) (1250) (2497)
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Educational expenditure, tuition,
private tutoring expenditure are measured in RMB per year.
The other relevant characteristics of households as well as the characteristics of house-
hold heads are summarised in Table 4.3. Migrants are more likely than locals to send their
children to private schools. Based on the available data, we are unable to distinguish be-
tween private schools which are of better quality than public schools (most likely used
by local urban households) and poor quality private schools used by migrants unable to
attend public schools. The per household number of children in school is slightly higher
for migrants compared to urban households, which is expected because the "one-child
policy" in China has always allowed households holding a rural hukou to have a second
child if their first child was a girl.
Consistent with literature, household heads tend to be male in both types of house-
holds. As expected, the heads of migrant households are younger and much less likely to
have gained a high school or higher degree. Only one in four migrant household heads
hold at least high school education, compared to 70% of their urban counterparts.
Consequently, 82% of migrant heads of household report working either in blue collar
or in service occupations and only 8.7% work in white collar occupations. The propor-
tions for urban households are 52% and 27% respectively. These occupation categories
have been defined following China’s Bureau of Statistics: service occupations includes
the lowest level of occupations, for instance in the hotel or catering industry, followed by
blue collar occupations which are manual occupations in sectors such as manufacturing
and construction. The white collar occupations are highest in the hierarchy occupations.
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To control for possible regional heterogeneity in households’ educational expendi-
tures, we introduce a set of dummies of geographic distribution of the households. Ide-
ally provinced-level dummies would have been used, but insufficient observations in
each category have lead us to regroup them as just three regions: the Central region in-
cludes the provinces of Anhui, Henan, Hubei. The Coastal region includes the provinces
of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The Western region regroups Chongqing
and Sichuan.
Table 4.3: Household characteristics by household hukou status
Households Local urban children t-value
migrating with children households difference
Number of children in school 1.31 1.05 -11.35
(per household) (0.549) ( 0.228)
Having children enrolling in private schools 0.144 0.054 -6.05
(1=yes; 0 otherwise) (0.351) (0.225)
Household head’s age 38.27 44.80 21.10
(5.61) (9.07)
Household head’s gender 0.739 0.617 -5.84
(1=male; 0 otherwise) (0.44) (0.486)
Household head’s level of education 0.237 0.704 23.26
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.426) (0.457)
Household head’s occupation
Service occupation 0.555 0.198 -16.30
Blue-collar occupation 0.271 0.330 2.86
White-collar occupation 0.087 0.279 12.42
Other 0.087 0.193 7.25
Region
Central 0.467 0.314 -6.75
Coastal 0.337 0.487 6.75
West 0.196 0.199 0.176
Observations 632 1795
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Bold numbers indicate statistical
significance at 1% level.
60
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 OLS Regression of Total Educational Expenditure
We begin the analysis by investigating the difference in total educational expenditure of
migrant households and local urban households. The regression is written as :
lnYh = β0 + β1Mh +Xhγ + , (4.2)
where Yh is the total household educational expenditure. To mitigate the concerns of
heteroscedasticity, we use the natural logarithmic transformation of educational expen-
diture as the dependent variable 4. Mh is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for mi-
grant households and 0 for local urban households5. Xh is a vector of control variables
referring to characteristics of households and heads of households, such as private or
public types of school, household per capita income, per household number of children
in school, gender, age, level of education and occupation of household head. We also
include regional dummies in the regression in order to capture region fixed effects.  is
the i.i.d error term.
4.4.2 Tobit Regression of Types of Expenditure
In order to understand the heterogeneity in patterns of education-related expenditure,
we analyzed, beyond the total spending on education, the three previously defined sub-
categories of educational expenditure, namely tuition fees, sponsorship fees and private
tutoring expenditure. In these analyses, large numbers of households in our sample have
reported zero amounts of expenditure, making OLS estimation inappropriate. We rely
instead on tobit models in the remainder of this section y will stand in turn for the three
subcategories of educational expenditure.
The standard equation for the tobit model is the following :
4 For the 42 households in the sample who reported having no educational expenditure, a
value of 1 is assigned.
5Some households may prefer not to report their low levels of educational expenditure. How-
ever, the survey did not explore the nature of these zero expenses, we therefore are not able to
distinguish the real reported zero expenditure from the others.
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y∗ = Xβ + , |X Normal(0, σ2) (4.3)
y = max(0, y∗) (4.4)
where y∗ is a latent variable. X is a vector of explanatory variables with the first
element being unity. β is a column vector of coefficients. The conditional expectation of
E(y|X, y > 0) is equal to:
E(y|X, y > 0) = Xβ + σ[φ(Xβ/σ)/Φ(Xβ/σ)]. (4.5)
The expectation of E(y|x) follows :
E(y|X) = Φ(Xβ/σ)Xβ + σφ(Xβ/σ). (4.6)
For a continuous explanatory variable, the equations of marginal effects and of marginal
effects conditional on being uncensored are given by:
∂E(y|X)
∂xj
= Φ(Xβ/σ)βj , (4.7)
∂E(y|X, y > 0)
∂xj
= βj{1− λ(Xβ/σ)[Xβ/σ + λ(Xβ/σ)]}. (4.8)
where λ(Xβ/σ) = φ(Xβ/σ)/Φ(Xβ/σ) is the inverse Mills ratio. φ and Φ are the prob-
ability and cumulative density functions, respectively.
In our case, the variable of key interest is the binary variable Mh. We report two esti-
mates of the effect of migration status on educational expenditure. The first is estimated
including censored and uncensored observations as: E(y|Xh,Mh = 1)−E(y|Xh,Mh = 0)
(as in equation 4.6). The second one is estimated using only the uncensored observations
as: E(y|Xh, y > 0,Mh = 1)− E(y|Xh, y > 0,Mh = 0) (as in equation 4.5).
As the reference by Wooldridge (2010), for example, if we define, wˆh1 is the estimated
index for a migrant household h and wˆh0 is the estimated index for a urban children
household h. The estimated difference is obtained by
N−1
N∑
n=1
{[Φ(wˆh1/σˆ)wˆh1 + σˆφ(wˆh1/σˆ)]− [Φ(wˆh0/σˆ)wˆh0 + σˆφ(wˆh0/σˆ)]}
where wˆh1 = βˆ0 + βˆ1 +Xhγ and wˆh0 = βˆ0 +Xhγ.
As total household educational expenditure, tuition, private tutoring expenditure and
sponsorship expenditure are analyzed in logarithmic transformation.
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4.5 Estimation Results
In this section we first assess the heterogeneity in total educational expenditure between
migrant households and local urban households. We then report the results regarding tu-
ition fees, private tutoring and sponsorship expenditure. A series of checks are reported
to gauge the robustness of our results.
4.5.1 Estimation Results of Total Educational Expenditure and
Three Subcategories
Table 4.4 displays results estimated according to the strategy described in the previous
section. Column (a) presents OLS regression coefficients of the log transformation of
total educational expenditure on explanatory variables. Columns (b) to (d) report the
maximum likelihood Tobit regression coefficients of the log transformation of three sub-
categories of educational expenditures on the same explanatory variables.
According to the first row of column (a), the null hypothesis that there is no difference
in total educational expenditure between migrant households and local urban house-
holds is rejected at the 1% significance level. After controlling for family and regional
characteristics, migrant households are found to spend 36% 6 more than urban house-
holds on their children’s education in 2007. This reverses the conclusion reached based
on the unconditional mean difference reported in Table 4.1. Household spending on edu-
cation is highly related to household income, with households in the top income quintile
spending 66% more than those in the 1st quintile.
As expected, the total spending on education for households with children studying
in private schools is higher than the one of families whose children are enrolled in public
schools. Every extra child increases the household’s educational expenditure by 55%. Re-
garding the characteristics of household heads, expenditure on education raises around
14.6% if the head of family is female. The age of the household head has a significant
and positive effect. The household heads who have earned at least a high school degree
spend more on their children’s education. However, the heads’ occupation influences lit-
tle the family’s educational expenditure everything else being equal. Households in the
Coastal region have the highest educational expenditure, which might be explained by
the fact that some areas of China’s east-coast are better developed and many high-quality
private schools are located there. Parents therefore have more choices for their children’s
6Exp(0.309)− 1 = 1.36− 1 = 0.36.
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private education.
Table 4.4: Regression coefficients for household educational expenditure and its
subcategories
OLS coefficients Tobit maximum likelihood coefficients
Dependent variables Total educational Tuition Private tutoring Sponsorship
in natural logarithm expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.309∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ 5.49∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.139) (0.355) (0.908)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.269∗∗∗ 0.102 1.04∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.102) (0.154) (0.392) (1.01)
Third quintile 0.365 ∗∗∗ 0.242∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.883
(0.10) (0.155) (0.395) (1.01)
Fourth quintile 0.399∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.716∗ -0.013
(0.106) (0.160) (0.407) ( 1.08)
Fifth quintile 0.504∗∗∗ 0.047 1.51∗∗∗ 1.32
(0.119) (0.170) (0.429) ( 1.15)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.349∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.124 2.03∗
(1= yes; 0 otherwise) (0.117) (0.460) (0.265) (1.11)
Per household number of children in school 0.443∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ -0.235 0.950
(0.082) (0.140) (0.365) (0.835)
Household head’s age 0.035∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.045)
Household head’s gender -0.146∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ 0.046 0.953
(1=male; 0=female) (0.071) (0.105) (0.265) (0.722)
Household head’s level of education 0.273∗∗∗ 0.211∗ 1.13∗∗∗ -0.671
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.076) (0.112) (0.284) (0.761)
Household head’s occupation
(ref: Blue-collar occupation)
White-collar occupation 0.039 0.135 -0.232 -0.717
(0.084) (0.136) (0.339) (0.954)
Service sector occupation 0.008 0.038 0.012 -0.03
(0.080) (0.130) (0.328) (0.862)
Other occupation -0.481 ∗∗∗ -0.896 ∗∗∗ 0.374 1.32
(0.112) (0.165) (0.416) (1.11)
Region (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.501∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗ - 3.03∗∗
(0.079) (0.117) (0.296) (0.808)
Western 0.439∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.380 0.694
(0.089) (0.135) (0.343) (0.868)
Constant 4.76∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ -6.99∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.361) (0.914) (2.43)
Observations 2427 2427 2427 2427
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Total educational expenditure is the sum of tuition, private tutoring expenditure,
sponsorship expenditure and other educational expenditure. Yearly total educational expenditure, tuition, private tutoring expenditure and sponsorship
expenditure are measured in RMB. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Number of left-censored observations at ln(tuition)=0: 194. Number of left-
censored observations at ln(private tutoring expenditure)=0: 1063. Number of left-censored observations at ln(sponsorship expenditure)=0 : 2035. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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To refine our findings that migrants spend more than local residents on their children’s
education, we estimated the impact of the same set of explanatory variables on migrants’
and locals’ expenditure for tuition, sponsorship and private tutoring separately. The To-
bit maximum likelihood coefficients reported in columns (b) to (d) of Table 4.4 not being
directly interpretable, we show in Table 4.5 the average difference between the expendi-
ture of migrants and locals for the three subcategories. Full regression coefficient tables
are presented in Appendix.
The estimates in the first row in Table 4.5 show that, after controlling for all family
and regional characteristics, the spending of migrant households on tuition is substan-
tially higher than that of local urban households and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Migrant households are shown to spend 133% more on tuition than urban ones
(in column (a))7. The significantly higher amounts spent on tuition by migrants reflect
the unequal accessibility of public schools among children of local and migrant parents:
many migrants who fail to access public school education turn to private migrant schools,
where tuition fees are often set at levels more reasonable than those charged by public
schools for migrant students. This in line with results found by other studies such as Lai
et al. (2014).
Table 4.5: Difference in natural logarithm of tuition, sponsorship and private tu-
toring expenditure
E(ln(y)|X,Mh = 1)- E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,Mh = 1)-
E(ln(y)|X,Mh = 0) E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,Mh = 0)
(a) (b)
Tuition expenditure 0.844∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.135)
Sponsorship expenditure 1.03∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.205)
Private tutoring expenditure -1.10∗∗∗ -0.781 ∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.148)
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Tuition, sponsorship and private tutoring expenditure are measured in RMB
per year. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Number of left-censored observations at ln(tuition)=0: 194. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(sponsorship)=0 : 2035. Number of left-censored observations at ln(private tutoring in total)=0: 1063. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
The gap between migrants’ and locals’ spending is even larger when it comes to the
sponsorship expenditure as shown in second row of Table 4.5. Consistent with litera-
ture and with our expectation, households holding a local city hukou spend much less
on sponsorship fees than those lacking one. Goodburn (2009) also found that migrant
children were charged 5 or 6 times the fees charged to local students during the stage of
compulsory education.
7 Exp(0.844)− 1 = 2.33− 1 = 1.33.
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By contrast, migrants spend overwhelmingly less than locals on private tutoring (see
third row of Table 4.5). Drawing on households who report positive private tutoring
expenditure (column (b)), we estimate the spending of migrants to be 54% lower than
that of locals. One possible explanation is that tuition and sponsorship fees account for
large shares of migrants households’ income so that budge constraint prevents them from
affording private tutoring.
4.5.2 Robustness of The Estimated Coefficients
A series of robustness checks are performed to verify the validity of the results presented
above. The estimated coefficients for the variable of interest Mh are reported in Table 4.6
and in Table 4.7. The full tables can be found in the Appendix.
First, in panel A, we present estimates obtained by using expenditure on each individ-
ual child as opposed to household expenditure. In these estimations we also control for
the birth order of the child, the gender of the child, the grade and the quality of school (as
assessed by the parents). In panel B, we only include as migrants the households with
non-local rural hukou. This excludes migrant children holding city hukou but coming
from other cities, as these children might be able to attend public schools and might have
a better social status (Chen and Feng, 2013). Finally, in panel C, we restrict our sample
to local and migrant families having children in compulsory education because children
are supposed to receive free public education during that period.
The regression coefficients in Panel A are slightly larger in magnitude compared to
those estimated at the household level, but neither the sign nor the statistical significance
of the results change. The results drawn from both the set of coefficients in panel B and
in panel C are in line with the one presented by our baseline estimations.
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Table 4.6: Robustness checks
OLS Tobit maximum E(ln(y)|X,M = 1)- E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,M = 1)-
coefficients likelihood coefficients E(ln(y)|X,M = 0) E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,M = 0)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Panel A. Individual level data
Sample size: 2654
Total educational expenditure 0.388∗∗∗
(0.082)
Tuition 0.790 ∗∗∗ 0.787 ∗∗∗ 0.768 ∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.115) (0.112)
Private tutoring -1.65 ∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.179) (0.130)
Sponsorship expenditure 6.16∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.178) (0.179)
Panel B. Only include migrant households with rural hukou
Sample size: 2268
Total educational expenditure 0.322∗∗∗
(0.092)
Tuition 0.906∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.152) (0.149)
Private tutoring -2.02∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.220) (0.156)
Sponsorship expenditure 6.13∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗
(1.034) (0.235) (0.237)
Panel C. Only include households with children in compulsory education
Sample size: 1639
Total educational expenditure 0.380∗∗∗
(0.104)
Tuition 0.976∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.163) (0.156)
Private tutoring -1.75∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗∗ -0.871∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.248) (0.176)
Sponsorship expenditure 6.51∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗
(0.904) (0.262) (0.233)
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
We also examine the difference between migrants and local residents in the budget
share they allocate to total educational expenditure, tuition, sponsorship expenditure
and private tutoring expenditure. The budget share is calculated by dividing the cor-
responding education expenditure to the household total consumption. The estimated
coefficients, presented in Table 4.7, lead to the same conclusions as those drawn using
the absolute educational expenditure.
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Table 4.7: The budget share spent on education-related expenditure
OLS Tobit maximum E(ln(y)|X,M = 1)- E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,M = 1)-
coefficients likelihood coefficients E(ln(y)|X,M = 0) E(ln(y)|X, y > 0,M = 0)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Sample size: 2383
Total educational expenditure 0.034 ∗∗∗
(0.007)
Tuition 0.04 ∗∗∗ 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Private tutoring -0.024 ∗∗∗ -0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Sponsorship expenditure 0.069∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003)
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
The share spent on tuition by migrant households is 3% higher than that of local urban
households. This gap is narrowed to 2.2% if we consider only uncensored sample. In
terms of sponsorship expenditure, the share spent by migrants is 1.2% larger than that
spent by locals. However, the share allocated by migrants to private tutoring expenditure
is 1.1% lower than that of locals.
4.6 The Educational Expenditure Gap between Per-
manent Migrant Households and Urban House-
holds
By comparing educational expenditure of migrant households who have obtained a lo-
cal city hukou to that of local urban households, we investigate the difference between
migrants and locals in cases when the hukou related barriers do not exist. It is hard but
possible for migrants to obtain a local city hukou, and thus become permanent migrants,
either through education or through employment. In our sample there are 351 house-
holds who reported having changed their hukou to a local city one. These permanent
migrant households would draw on the same welfare benefits as local urban residents,
including access to free public education in the nearby school for their children.
The regression coefficients, estimated using the same strategy as the one descibed in
section 4.4.1 and the same control variables as the one in the analysis in section 4.5, are
displayed in Table 4.8.
68
4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Table 4.8: Regression coefficients on the educational expenditure of permanent
migrant households
OLS Tobit maximum E(ln(y)|X,PM = 1)- E(ln(y)|X, y > 0, PM = 1)-
coefficients likelihood coefficients E(ln(y)|X,PM = 0) E(ln(y)|X, y > 0, PM = 0)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Sample size: 1795
Total educational expenditure -0.148∗
(0.09)
Tuition -0.522∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.154) (0.145)
Private tutoring -0.188 -0.130 -0.092
(0.353) (0.242) (0.171)
Sponsorship expenditure 3.03∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(1.22) (0.171) (0.23)
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. The full tables can be found in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
After controlling for economic and social characteristics, a permanent migrant house-
hold would spend 14.8% less on children’s education than a urban household who never
change their hukou. The lower overall educational expenditure of permanent migrant
households is mainly due to the lower tuition fees paid. However, the sponsorship fees
they pay are 38.2% higher than that of local urban residents. These results suggest that
families with migration background pursue with different means the same aim of pro-
viding their children with good education as local families: local households may pay
higher tuition in private good quality schools whereas permanent migrants choose to
pay higher sponsorship fees in schools of better quality.
An important difference compared to the previous results is that private tutoring ex-
penditure is now not different between the two groups. This suggests that when institu-
tional arrangements are the same, so migrants do not need to substitute public spending
with private expenditure, their taste for the children’s private tutoring does not differ.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter explores how the hukou status, the family characteristics and the region of
residence determine household expenditure on the children’s education.
Because of the hukou system, children migrating to China’s cities with their parents
have limited access to free public schools. They may either pay fees to go to migrant
schools or pay to be enrolled in public schools.
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Using the 2008 wave of RUMiC data, we compare the educational expenditure of mi-
grant households to that of local urban households. We find that the total educational
expenditure of migrants overwhelmingly exceeds that of locals after controlling for social
and economic characteristics, both in absolute amounts and as in budget shares. More
detailed analysis of three subcategories of the education-related expenditure shows that
migrant households spend more on tuition and sponsorship compared to households
with local city hukou, but much less on private tutoring.
Though there is still a debate whether private tutoring benefits children’s school per-
formance in the field of educational studies, Zhang and Liu (2016) examined the effects of
private tutoring on educational performance of children in China, he found significantly
positive effects of private tutoring on children’s language and math test scores. Exist-
ing literature has suggested that in China, urban children’s school performance is better
than the migrant worker’s children (Zhang et al., 2015). Hence the low educational in-
vestment in private tutoring may provide an explanation of the educational performance
inferiority of migrant children to urban children.
We also find different patterns of education-related expenditure between migrant house-
holds who have obtained a local city hukou and local urban households who did not
change their hukou. When hukou barriers do not matter, we find no difference between
permanent migrants and locals.
Private educational expenditure of households in China’s cities reflects both willing-
ness to investment in human capital and institutional constraints. Our results suggest
the hukou policy at least the way it was implemented in 2007 put financial burdens on
migrant parents. To the extend that China would like to guarantee equal educational
opportunities for all children relaxing or providing more funding to schools who accept
migrant workers’ children are policy options.
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Table 4.9: Tobit coefficients for tuition fees
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
tuition expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.848∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.138) (0.135)
Per household number of children in school 0.511∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.140) (0.135)
Household head’s age 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Household head’s gender -0.408∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗
(1=male; 0=female) (0.105) (0.105) (0.102)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.694∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.182) (0.181) (0.178)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.102 0.101 0.0978
(0.154) (0.153) (0.147)
Third quintile 0.242 0.240 0.232
(0.155) (0.154) (0.149)
Fourth quintile 0.353∗ 0.352∗ 0.341∗
(0.159) (0.158) (0.154)
Fifth quintile 0.047 0.047 0.045
(0.170) (0.169) (0.163)
Household head’s level of education 0.211 ∗ 0.199 0.192
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.112) (0.111) (0.108)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation 0.135 0.134 0.131
(0.136) (0.135) (0.131)
Service sector occupation 0.038 0.037 0.036
(0.130) (0.129) (0.125)
Other -0.896∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗ -0.850∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.163) (0.155)
Region (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.468∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.117) (0.112)
Western 0.852∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.135) (0.131)
Constant 1.92∗∗∗
(0.361)
Observations 2427 2427 2427
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Tuition) =0: 194. Number of uncensored observations: 2233. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.10: Tobit coefficients for household private tutoring expenditure
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
private tutoring expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children -1.79∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.208) (0.148)
Per household number of children in school -0.235 -0.151 -0.108
(0.365) (0.235) (0.167)
Household head’s age -0.065∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011) (0.008)
Household head’s gender 0.046 0.030 0.021
(1=male; 0=female) (0.265) (0.170) (0.121)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.124 0.080 0.057
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.460) (0.299) (0.213)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 1.04∗∗ 0.647∗∗ 0.459∗∗
(0.392) (0.244) (0.173)
Third quintile 1.03∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.454∗∗
(0.395) (0.246) (0.174)
Fourth quintile 0.716 0.438 0.311
(0.407) (0.249) (0.177)
Fifth quintile 1.52∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.274) (0.195)
Household head’s level of education 1.14∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.284) (0.179) (0.127)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
Other occupation 0.374 0.245 0.174
(0.416) (0.274) (0.195)
White-collar occupation -0.232 -0.147 -0.105
(0.339) (0.214) (0.153)
Service sector occupation 0.012 0.008 0.005
(0.328) (0.211) (0.150)
Region (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.652∗ 0.418∗ 0.297∗
(0.296) (0.189) (0.134)
Western 0.380 0.240 0.170
(0.343) (0.218) (0.155)
Constant 3.683∗∗∗
(0.914)
Observations 2427 2427 2427
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations
at ln(Private tutoring expenditure) =0: 1063 . Number of uncensored observations: 1364. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.11: Tobit coefficients for household sponsorship expenditure
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
sponsorship expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 5.49∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
(0.908) (0.200) (0.205)
Per household number of children in school 0.950 0.161 0.192
(0.835) (0.141) (0.169)
Household head’s age -0.140∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.045) (0.008) (0.009)
Household head’s gender 2.03 0.382 0.430
(1=male; 0=female) (1.11) (0.232) (0.247)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.124 0.080 0.057
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.460) (0.299) (0.213)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.034 0.005 0.007
(1.014) (0.163) (0.201)
Third quintile 0.883 0.150 0.179
(1.01) (0.172) (0.204)
Fourth quintile -0.013 -0.002 -0.003
(1.08) (0.173) (0.213)
Fifth quintile 1.32 0.231 0.271
(1.15) (0.204) (0.236)
Household head’s level of education -0.723 -0.123 -0.147
(0.762) (0.130) (0.155)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
Other occupation 1.32 0.242 0.277
(1.11) (0.211) (0.236)
White-collar occupation -0.717 -0.115 -0.142
(0.954) (0.152) (0.188)
Service sector occupation -0.030 -0.005 -0.006
(0.862) (0.145) (0.174)
Region (ref: Central region)
Coastal -2.95∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗
(0.807) (0.131) (0.160)
Western 0.694 0.141 0.152
(0.868) (0.178) (0.191)
Constant -7.0∗∗
(2.43)
Observations 2427 2427 2427
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations
at ln(Sponsorship expenditure) =0: 2035 . Number of uncensored observations: 392. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.12: Tobit coefficients for tuition expenditure - individual level data
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
tuition expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.790∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.112) (0.110)
Birth order of children -0.207 -0.206 -0.20
(0.115) (0.119) (0.116)
Grade of children 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Children’s gender 0.127 0.127 0.123
(1=male; 0 =female) (0.082) (0.082) (0.08)
Household head’s gender -0.175 -0.175 -0.170
(1=male; 0 =female) (0.105) (0.105) (0.102)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.733∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.166) (0.159) (0.157)
Quality of school of children (ref: best in areas)
Better than average -0.243 -0.242 -0.236
(0.130) (0.127) (0.124)
Average -0.284∗ -0.283∗ -0.276∗
(0.139) (0.135) (0.131)
Worse than average -0.511 -0.509 -0.494
(0.530) (0.495) (0.478)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.141) (0.133) (0.129)
Third quintile 0.119 0.119 0.116
(0.132) (0.135) (0.132)
Fourth quintile 0.123 0.123 0.119
(0.149) (0.143) (0.139)
Fifth quintile -0.174 -0.173 -0.168
(0.174) (0.151) (0.146)
Household head’s level of education 0.239∗ 0.238∗ 0.231∗
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.105) (0.010) (0.09)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation 0.092 0.092 0.090
(0.133) (0.120) (0.117)
Service sector occupation 0.079 0.0790 0.077
(0.116) (0.112) (0.109)
Other occupation -0.029 -0.0290 -0.028
(0.143) (0.133) (0.130)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.420∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.102) (0.010)
Western 0.835∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.119) (0.116)
Constant 4.536∗∗∗
(0.238)
Observations 2654 2654 2654
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Tuition) =0: 223. Number of uncensored observations: 2431. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.13: Tobit coefficients for private tutoring expenditure - individual level
data
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
private tutoring expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children -1.65∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.179) (0.130)
Birth order of children -1.912∗∗∗ -1.173∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.217) (0.158)
Grade of children -0.189∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0841∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.009) (0.006)
Children’s gender -0.45∗∗ -0.29∗∗ -0.203∗∗
(1=male; 0=female) (0.225) (0.138) (0.100)
Household head’s gender -0.227 -0.140 -0.102
(1=male; 0=female) (0.251) (0.155) (0.113)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.272 0.169 0.123
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.439) (0.276) (0.200)
Quality of school of children (ref: best in areas)
Better than average -0.327 -0.208 -0.150
(0.346) (0.222) (0.161)
Average -0.842∗ -0.521∗ -0.378∗
(0.369) (0.233) (0.169)
Worse than average -3.128∗ -1.697∗∗ -1.249∗
(1.466) (0.657) (0.503)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 1.187∗∗ 0.700∗∗ 0.508∗∗
(0.374) (0.220) (0.159)
Third quintile 1.197∗∗ 0.706∗∗ 0.512∗∗
(0.379) (0.222) (0.161)
Fourth quintile 0.931∗ 0.541∗ 0.393∗
(0.401) (0.232) (0.169)
Fifth quintile 1.535∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.252) (0.183)
Household head’s level of education -0.400 -0.244 -0.177
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.366) (0.222) (0.161)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.255 -0.156 -0.114
(0.327) (0.201) (0.146)
Service sector occupation -0.077 -0.048 -0.035
(0.310) (0.192) (0.140)
Other occupation -0.400 -0.244 -0.177
(0.366) (0.222) (0.161)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.867∗∗ 0.530∗∗ 0.384∗∗
(0.283) (0.172) (0.125)
Western 0.525 0.315 0.228
(0.329) (0.199) (0.144)
Constant 4.980∗∗∗
(0.693)
Observations 2654 2654 2654
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations
at ln(Private tutoring expenditure) =0: 1225. Number of uncensored observations: 1429. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.14: Tobit coefficients for sponsorship expenditure - individual level data
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
sponsorship expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 6.16∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.178) (0.179)
Birth order of children 0.314 0.055 0.064
(0.733) (0.129) (0.149)
Grade of children -0.396∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.009) (0.010)
Children’s gender 0.592 0.103 0.120
(1=male; 0=female) (0.573) (0.10) (0.116)
Household head’s gender 0.573 0.099 0.116
(1=male; 0=female) (0.658) (0.112) (0.132)
Having children enrolling in private schools 0.884 0.162 0.184
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (1.033) (0.199) (0.219)
Quality of school of children (ref: best in areas)
Better than average -2.41∗∗ -0.483∗ -0.521∗
(0.921) (0.201) (0.207)
Average -2.70∗∗ -0.531∗ -0.579∗∗
(0.971) (0.208) (0.216)
Worse than average -3.06 -0.589 -0.649
(3.016) (0.493) (0.594)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.267 0.045 0.053
(0.905) (0.152) (0.180)
Third quintile 0.922 0.161 0.187
(0.927) (0.162) (0.188)
Fourth quintile 0.039 0.006 0.008
(1.02) (0.168) (0.201)
Fifth quintile 1.354 0.244 0.278
(1.074) (0.196) (0.222)
Household head’s level of education -0.732 -0.128 -0.149
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.704) (0.123) (0.143)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.497 -0.085 -0.100
(0.895) (0.153) (0.180)
Service sector occupation 0.045 0.008 0.009
(0.786) (0.140) (0.161)
Other occupation -0.149 -0.026 -0.030
(0.970) (0.170) (0.197)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal -2.231∗∗ -0.376∗∗ -0.447∗∗
(0.736) (0.124) (0.147)
Western 0.472 0.095 0.102
(0.807) (0.163) (0.175)
Constant -6.05∗∗∗
(1.717)
Observations 2654 2654 2654
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations
at ln(Sponsorship expenditure) =0: 2211. Number of uncensored observations: 443. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.15: Tobit coefficients for tuition expenditure - only include migrant house-
holds with rural hukou
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
tuition expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.848∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.138) (0.135)
Per household number of children in school 0.451∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.433∗∗
(0.154) (0.153) (0.148)
Household head’s age 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Household head’s gender -0.467∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗
(1=male; 0=female) (0.110) (0.110) (0.106)
Having children enrolling in private schools 0.717∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.191) (0.190) (0.187)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.025 0.025 0.024
(0.155) (0.154) (0.149)
Third quintile 0.206 0.205 0.198
(0.171) (0.170) (0.164)
Fourth quintile 0.353∗ 0.351∗ 0.340∗
(0.170) (0.169) (0.164)
Fifth quintile -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(0.180) (0.179) (0.172)
Household head’s level of education 0.217 0.216 0.208
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.117) (0.116) (0.112)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation 0.128 0.127 0.123
(0.140) (0.139) (0.135)
Service sector occupation 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.137) (0.136) (0.132)
Other occupation -1.01∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗ -0.949∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.168) (0.159)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.492∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.121) (0.116)
West 0.910∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.143) (0.139)
Constant 1.92∗∗∗
(0.379)
Observations 2268 2268 2268
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Tuition) =0: 187. Number of uncensored observations: 2081. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.16: Tobit coefficients for private tutoring - only include migrant house-
holds with rural hukou
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
private tutoring expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children -2.02∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.220) (0.158)
Per household number of children in school 0.147 0.096 0.068
(0.389) (0.254) (0.180)
Household head’s age -0.065∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011) (0.008)
Household head’s gender 0.121 0.078 0.056
(1=male; 0=female) (0.272) (0.177) (0.126)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.254 0.167 0.119
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.472) (0.315) (0.224)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 1.10∗∗ 0.687∗∗ 0.487∗∗
(0.391) (0.243) (0.172)
Third quintile 1.03∗ 0.643∗ 0.456∗
(0.426) (0.266) (0.189)
Fourth quintile 0.999∗ 0.624∗ 0.442∗
(0.427) (0.265) (0.188)
Fifth quintile 1.53∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.287) (0.203)
Household head’s level of education 1.25∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.291) (0.185) (0.131)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.192 -0.123 -0.0875
(0.342) (0.219) (0.156)
Service sector occupation 0.067 0.043 0.031
(0.339) (0.221) (0.157)
Other occupation 0.502 0.334 0.238
(0.423) (0.283) (0.202)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.679∗ 0.440∗ 0.312∗
(0.302) (0.195) (0.138)
West 0.457 0.293 0.208
(0.358) (0.231) (0.164)
Constant 3.00∗∗
(0.940)
Observations 2268 2268 2268
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Private tutoring) =0: 978. Number of uncensored observations: 1290. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
78
4.8. APPENDIX
Table 4.17: Tobit coefficients for sponsorship expenditure - only include migrant
households with rural hukou
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
sponsorship expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 6.13∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗
(1.03) (0.235) (0.237)
Per household number of children in school 1.01 0.156 0.197
(0.965) (0.149) (0.188)
Household head’s age -0.133∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.049) (0.008) (0.009)
Household head’s gender 0.846 0.128 0.164
(1=male; 0=female) (0.795) (0.119) (0.153)
Having children enrolled in private schools 1.74 0.293 0.352
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (1.23) (0.227) (0.259)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile -0.048 -0.007 -0.009
(1.09) (0.149) (0.202)
Third quintile 2.22 0.354 0.438
(1.19) (0.192) (0.235)
Fourth quintile 0.594 0.085 0.112
(1.21) (0.175) (0.230)
Fifth quintile 2.07 0.327 0.407
(1.28) (0.206) (0.253)
Household head’s level of education -0.546 -0.085 -0.107
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.837) (0.130) (0.164)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.917 -0.136 -0.176
(1.02) (0.150) (0.196)
Service sector occupation -0.540 -0.082 -0.105
(0.961) (0.145) (0.186)
Other occupation 1.48 0.256 0.302
(1.20) (0.215) (0.248)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal -3.24∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.134) (0.170)
West 0.805 0.154 0.172
(0.978) (0.189) (0.210)
Constant 3.00∗∗
(0.940)
Observations 2268 2268 2268
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Sponsorship) =0: 1933. Number of uncensored observations: 335. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.18: Tobit coefficients for tuition expenditure - only include households
with children in compulsory education
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
tuition expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.976∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.163) (0.156)
Per Number of children in school 0.831∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.130) (0.122)
Household head’s age 0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Household head’s gender -0.295∗ -0.292∗ -0.276∗
(1=male; 0=female) (0.128) (0.127) (0.120)
Having children enrolling in private schools 0.873∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.205) (0.204) (0.198)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile -0.163 -0.161 -0.152
(0.185) (0.183) (0.173)
Third quintile -0.031 -0.030 -0.029
(0.190) (0.188) (0.178)
Fourth quintile -0.036 -0.036 -0.034
(0.197) (0.194) (0.184)
Fifth quintile -0.321 -0.317 -0.299
(0.215) (0.212) (0.200)
Household head’s level of education 0.330∗ 0.326∗ 0.307∗
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.139) (0.137) (0.129)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.025 -0.025 -0.023
(0.171) (0.169) (0.160)
Service sector occupation -0.037 -0.036 -0.034
(0.156) (0.155) (0.146)
Other occupation -0.348 -0.343 -0.323
(0.205) (0.202) (0.189)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.401∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.370∗∗
(0.144) (0.142) (0.133)
Western 1.22∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.162) (0.155)
Constant 3.22∗∗∗
(0.422)
Observations 1639 1639 1639
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Tuition) =0: 176. Number of uncensored observations: 1463. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.19: Tobit coefficients for private tutoring expenditure - only include
households with children in compulsory education
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
private tutoring expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children -1.75∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗∗ -0.871∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.248) (0.176)
Per household number of children in school -0.359 -0.256 -0.185
(0.300) (0.214) (0.155)
Household head’s age -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.018) (0.013) (0.009)
Household head’s gender -0.557∗ -0.401 -0.291
(1=male; 0 otherwise) (0.282) (0.205) (0.149)
Having children enrolling in private schools -0.192 -0.136 -0.098
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.461) (0.324) (0.234)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 1.01∗ 0.685∗ 0.490∗
(0.418) (0.282) (0.202)
Third quintile 1.53∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.294) (0.211)
Fourth quintile 1.35∗∗ 0.929∗∗ 0.666∗∗
(0.441) (0.303) (0.217)
Fifth quintile 1.35∗∗ 0.929∗∗ 0.667∗∗
(0.479) (0.331) (0.237)
Household head’s level of education 1.05∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.307) (0.219) (0.157)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.154 -0.112 -0.0812
(0.371) (0.269) (0.195)
Service sector occupation -0.277 -0.199 -0.145
(0.346) (0.249) (0.181)
Other occupation -0.716 -0.505 -0.365
(0.453) (0.316) (0.228)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.695∗ 0.496∗ 0.358∗
(0.318) (0.227) (0.164)
West 0.324 0.227 0.164
(0.363) (0.255) (0.184)
Constant 2.66∗∗
(0.938)
Observations 1639 1639 1639
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Private tutoring) =0: 628. Number of uncensored observations: 1011. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.20: Tobit coefficients for sponsorship expenditure - only include house-
holds with children in compulsory education
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
sponsorship expenditure Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 6.51∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗
(0.904) (0.262) (0.233)
Per household number of children in school 1.48∗ 0.347∗ 0.346∗
(0.652) (0.153) (0.153)
Household head’s age -0.046 -0.011 -0.011
(0.046) (0.011) (0.011)
Household head’s gender 0.098 0.023 0.023
(1=male; 0=female) (0.709) (0.166) (0.166)
Having children enrolled in private schools 1.22 0.305 0.295
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (1.03) (0.271) (0.256)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.675 0.155 0.157
(0.971) (0.223) (0.225)
Third quintile 0.998 0.235 0.234
(1.02) (0.238) (0.238)
Fourth quintile -0.282 -0.061 -0.064
(1.08) (0.234) (0.244)
Fifth quintile 1.18 0.280 0.279
(1.19) (0.286) (0.282)
Household head’s level of education -0.180 -0.042 -0.042
(1 = high school and above; 0 otherwise) (0.766) (0.179) (0.179)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector workers)
White-collar occupation -1.39 -0.306 -0.316
(1.00) (0.216) (0.225)
Service sector occupation 0.104 0.025 0.025
(0.838) (0.203) (0.200)
Other occupation -0.047 -0.011 -0.011
(1.13) (0.271) (0.268)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal -1.97∗ -0.439∗ -0.451∗
(0.802) (0.178) (0.183)
Western 1.04 0.280 0.262
(0.866) (0.238) (0.220)
Constant -9.11∗∗
(2.39)
Observations 1639 1639 1639
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(Sponsorship) =0: 1277. Number of uncensored observations: 362. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.21: Tobit coefficients for the budget share spent on tuition
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
tuition expenditure share Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.040∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Per household number of children in school 0.016∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Household head’s age 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head’s gender -0.014∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(1=male; 0=female) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Third quintile -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Fourth quintile -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Fifth quintile -0.020∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Household head’s level of education 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
White-collar occupation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Service sector workers -0.011∗ -0.008∗ -0.006∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Other occupation -0.046∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.010∗ 0.007∗ 0.005∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Western 0.014∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant -0.091∗∗∗
(0.014)
Observations 2383 2383 2383
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(tuition) =0: 194. Number of uncensored observations: 2189. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.22: Tobit coefficients for the budget share spent on private tutoring
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
private tutoring share Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children -0.024∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Per household number of children in school -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Household head’s age -0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head’s gender -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(1=male; 0=female) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Having children enrolled in private schools -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.009 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Third quintile 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Fourth quintile -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Fifth quintile 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Household head’s level of education 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
Other occupation -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
White-collar occupation -0.007 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Service sector occupation 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Western -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.023∗
(0.012)
Observations 2383 2383 2383
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations
at ln(Private tutoring expenditure) =0: 1034 . Number of uncensored observations: 1349. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.23: Tobit coefficients for the budget share spent on sponsorship
Dependent variable : Natural logarithm of
sponsorship share Tobit E(y|X) E(y|X, y > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant households migrating with children 0.069∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003)
Per household number of school-aged children 0.028∗ 0.004∗ 0.006∗
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Household head’s age -0.002∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head’s gender 0.011 0.002 0.002
(1=male; 0 otherwise) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Having children enrolled in private schools 0..028 0.005 0.006
(1=private school; 0 otherwise) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004)
Per capita household income (ref : first quintile)
Second quintile 0.011 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.002) (0.003)
Third quintile 0.016 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.002) (0.003)
Fourth quintile -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.016) (0.002) (0.003)
Fifth quintile 0.011 0.002 0.002
(0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Household head’s level of education -0.013 -0.002 -0.003
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Household head’s occupation (ref: Blue-sector occupation)
Other occupation 0.023 0.004 0.005
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003)
White-collar occupation -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.002) (0.003)
Service sector occupation 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.002) (0.002)
Region of destination (ref: Central region)
Coastal -0.045∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Western 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.128∗∗∗
(0.036)
Observations 2383 2383 2383
Source of data: RUMiC data. MHS wave 2008 and UHS wave 2008. Notes: Expenditure is measured in RMB per year. Number of left-censored observations at
ln(sponsorship) =0: 1992 . Number of uncensored observations: 391. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Summing up all three individual chapters, the results provide an overall framework for
understanding the decision of internal migrant workers regarding their children.
One of the findings in Chapter 3 is that migrants’ children being schooled in cities do
not always perform better than their left-behind peers. On the other hand, Chapter 2
shows that Chinese internal migrant workers may be better off leaving children behind
if the relocation cost to the destination city is beyond a certain threshold. This leads to
the conclusion that, under the studied policy setting, leaving children behind in rural
hometowns might be the rational choice for migrant workers, no matter how much they
would like to take their children with them on subjective grounds.
Chapter 4 finds evidence that the hukou influences the patterns of household educa-
tional expenditure in cities. Chapter 2 also suggests that the decrease in relocation cost of
migrant workers in cities, such as diminishing school fees of their children, can encourage
them to take children with them.
Since the hukou policy is shown to increase relocation cost and migrant households’
educational expenditure, it could seem tempting to suggest abolishing the hukou policy.
However, the hukou system is justified by macrolevel concerns about resource allocation
instead of individual households concerns studied in this dissertation. This is why we
do not argue for the removal of the hukou policy based on the results presented here.
We could however conclude that more projects should be launched both in rural villages
and in destination cities in order to mitigate the burden of the migrant families. For
instance, local authorities could invest in building boarding schools or care centers in
villages, which provide physical and psychological support for the left behind children.
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Considerable efforts are needed to strengthen enforcement of abolishing the tuition and
miscellaneous fees for migrant children in compulsory education in China’s cities. The
subsidies or funding should be allocated to public schools in cities so as to encourage
them to reduce the gap how local and migrant children are treated in school.
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